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ABSTRACT
Apoorva Jain: LABOR MARKET ASSIMILATION OF IMMIGRANTS.
(Under the direction of Klara S. Peter)
The economic contribution of migrants to a host country are well known: they work in
sectors where labor is scarce, create jobs when becoming entrepreneurs, and also contribute
by paying taxes. For such potential contributions to materialize, immigrants’ successful par-
ticipation in the labor market is crucial. This dissertation analyzes the process of immigrant
assimilation in the host country’s labor market. The dissertation consists of two chapters,
both of which use German Socio-economic Panel from 1984 to 2014. Germany’s long history
of immigration and the availability of a long panel dataset makes the country a good choice
for this study.
In the first chapter, Timing of Migration, Immigrant Quality and Labor Market Assimi-
lation: Evidence from a Long Panel in Germany, I quantify how much immigrants assimilate
with each additional year spent in the host country. Hence, assimilation occurs if, between
two observationally equivalent immigrants, the one with greater time in Germany typically
earns more. The innovation of this chapter is to account for selection into the timing of
migration. I do so by jointly estimating an equation that explains variation in the timing
of migration and an equation that explains variation in wages while controlling for length
of time in the host country. The results show that a failure to account for the endogenous
timing of migration results in an upward bias in the commonly estimated average rate of
assimilation. Additionally, the estimates from the joint model reveal three key findings.
First, there is significant heterogeneity in individual-specific rates of assimilation among im-
migrants. Second, immigrants of low quality have a faster rate of assimilation than their
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high quality counterparts. Third, immigrants who have a greater propensity to migrate early
have a higher individual rate of assimilation.
The second chapter, Limits to Wage Growth: Understanding the Wage Divergence be-
tween Natives and Immigrants with Klara S. Peter, begins where the first chapter concludes.
The goal is to study the assimilation of immigrants with respect to natives and examine the
factors of assimilation that explain the significant variation found in individual rates of as-
similation. We find strong evidence of wage divergence between natives and immigrants. To
understand the factors behind the wage divergence, we theoretically derive testable hypothe-
ses of immigrant wage growth and empirically test them using a wage convergence model.
Individual rates of wage convergence are found to be higher for immigrants who fled the
warfare zones, belong to sizable ethnic networks, and acquired more years of pre-migration
schooling. One of the major contributions of the chapter is to account for endogeneity in
the accumulation of post-migration human capital, one of the factors of immigrant wage
growth. This endogeneity has largely been ignored in the previous literature. We find that
post-migration human capital significantly increases immigrant’s wage growth and thus de-
creases the likelihood of wage divergence. The chapter also addresses the commonly ignored
sample selection issue due to non-random survey attrition and employment participation.
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To my mother, who selflessly devoted her life to improve mine.
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Chapter 1: Timing of Migration, Immigrant Quality and Labor Market
Assimilation: Evidence from a Long Panel in Germany
1.1 Introduction
The immigrant assimilation hypothesis (Chiswick, 1978) conjectures that immigrants ac-
quire host country-specific human capital, that this increases with time spent in the host
country (henceforth called length of stay), and that they experience wage growth. The rate
of wage growth with respect to years since migration is known as the rate of assimilation.
Existing studies, such as Borjas (1987, 1994), Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2007), which have
assumed that years since migration is exogenous, have estimated an average rate of assimi-
lation.1 The length of stay depends on the timing of migration and, thus, it is endogenously
determined. This paper relaxes the exogeneity assumption by developing and estimating a
joint model of the timing of migration and wage assimilation in the labor market. The joint
model also measures individual-specific rates of assimilation. These individual specific rates
can be used to better inform immigration policies, which until now were based solely on the
quality of the immigrant at the time of migration and not her future ability to assimilate
well.
Forward-looking individuals decide whether or not to migrate on the basis of the net
expected utility of migration; in other words, the optimal timing of migration is a choice.
Consequently, years since migration, which is age minus age at migration, is not exogenous.
Ignoring the selective timing of migration can lead to an inconsistent estimate of the rate
of assimilation. Moreover, the commonly estimated average rate of assimilation neglects
the potential differences in the post-migration rate of human capital acquisition between
1Rarely, papers estimate assimilation rates for subgroups based on arrival cohorts such as Borjas (2013)
and Fertig and Schurer (2007).
immigrants who migrated at different ages. According to the economic theory of human
capital, younger individuals have a greater incentive to acquire human capital. Given that
differences in human capital investment result in different rates of assimilation, a twenty
year-old and a forty year-old immigrant are likely to have different rates of assimilation.
It is necessary to jointly estimate the timing of migration and wage assimilation to account
for unobserved individual factors that affect both the timing of migration and the immigrants
performance in the host country’s labor market. Unobserved characteristics, such as risk
attitude, personality, and ability, can affect the propensity to migrate and earnings growth
in the host country. For instance, immigrants with a high ability might have a lower cost of
migration and, thus, a higher propensity to migrate early. High ability individuals are likely
to experience high wage growth after migration.
In contrast, risk-averse individuals might have a low propensity to migrate early, and
they might avoid risky yet profitable job opportunities in the host country. In other words,
risk-averse immigrants might have a slower rate of assimilation. In such cases, the rate of
assimilation is correlated with both an unobserved propensity to migrate and the timing
of migration. To account for the interdependence of the timing of migration and wage
assimilation, the two processes should be estimated jointly.
Most papers that estimate the wage assimilation equation, such as Borjas (1987, 1994,
1988) and Antecol et al. (2006), use census data to estimate an average rate of assimilation
while controlling for arrival-cohort-specific unobserved immigrant quality.2 Thus, they as-
sume that immigrants within an arrival cohort have similar unobserved characteristics. A
few papers, including Fertig and Schurer (2007) and Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), use longitu-
dinal data and individual fixed effects to account for time-constant individual unobserved
heterogeneity. However, both longitudinal and cross-sectional studies implicitly assume that
unobserved immigrant quality directly affects wage level but not through the returns to
2A few papers like Cobb-Clark (1993) account for unobserved immigrant quality using a control function
approach by including macro variables indicating socio-economic development at the country of origin.
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the length of stay - i.e., they assume that rate of assimilation does not vary with immi-
grant quality.3 This paper relaxes these assumptions to estimate individual-specific rates of
assimilation that vary with immigrant quality.
While wage assimilation estimates are common in the literature, few papers estimate
the timing of the migration equation. The papers that do are limited by the fact that they
focus on the effect of a single factor on out-migration and analyze either domestic migration
or migration from a single country over a short period of time. For instance, Reed et al.
(2010) examine gender differences in mobility in Ghana; Henry et al. (2004) analyze the
effect of rainfall on first out-migration in Burkin Faso; Ezra and Kiros (2001) study the
effect of drought on rural out-migration within Ethiopia; and Hare (1999) analyzes rural
out-migration within China. In contrast, my study examines data on a much larger scale: I
estimate variation in the timing of migration for immigrants from over 100 countries during
a 53-year period (1961-2014).
To address these shortcomings in the existing models, I develop and estimate a joint model
of wage assimilation and the timing of migration. The joint model links the two equations
through correlation between immigrant quality, the individual-specific rate of assimilation
(both of which appear in the wage assimilation equation), and the unobserved propensity to
migrate early (which appears in the timing of migration equation). The timing of migration
is modeled as a continuous time parametric proportional hazard in which the hazard of
early migration depends on individual characteristics, macro-level factors of migration, and
an unobserved individual propensity to migrate early. The wage assimilation equation is
a linear mixed model in which the log of the wage depends on various individual-specific
factors, including years since migration and unobserved immigrant quality. The individual-
specific rate of assimilation is estimated using a random coefficient on years since migration
variable. Using the parameters estimated in the joint model, I estimate the Best Linear
3Borjas (2013) and Fertig and Schurer (2007) are notable exceptions which estimate rates of assimilation
for different arrival cohorts by interacting years since migration variable with the indicator variable for the
immigrant’s arrival cohort.
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Unbiased Predictions (BLUPs) which help recover the complete joint distribution of the
individual-specific rate of assimilation, immigrant quality, and the propensity to migrate
early. The joint distributions also help in understanding the relationship between these
components.
However, the joint model estimation suffers from an unignorable limitation, the inability
to include non-migrants in the study. As is the case with most migration studies, we only
have information on immigrants within a host country. Existing papers such as Borjas
(1985, 1994) Hu (2000) and Fertig and Schurer (2007) use migration cohort or individual
fixed effects to account for self-selection of immigrants. In the same spirit, I account for
permanent unobserved heterogeneity which should partly control for the issue of selection of
immigrants.
I estimate the proposed joint model using data on immigrants in the German Socio-
Economic Panel (henceforth called SOEP) for the period 1984-2014.4 Since the 1950s, Ger-
many has had a long and diverse history of immigration, and for this reason it provides
an excellent location to study immigrants economic assimilation. As of 2015, Germany has
hosted more than 12 million immigrants, which is the second highest stock of immigrants
(behind the United States of America) in the world. Moreover, SOEP over-samples immi-
grants and provides information on the country of origin and the year of migration for a
large sample of immigrants. Using this information, I construct pre-migration histories from
which I estimate the timing of the migration equation. To explain pre-migration histories, I
collect data on macro-level migration factors from 1961 to 2014, and these are then merged
with individual level pre-migration characteristics using the year of migration and country
of origin. These long panel data allow me to estimate long-term assimilation rates, which in
the literature is a rare achievement.
The joint model is estimated for individuals who migrated after the age of 13 between
4 The data used in this paper were made available to us by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study at
the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin), BerlinWagner et al. (2007)
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1961 and 2014. I limit the sample to youth and adult migrants because: (1) child migrants
are not likely to make individual migration decisions and (2) the assimilation experience of
child migrants could differ from that of youth and adult migrants. For instance, Bleakley
and Chin (2004, 2008, 2010) show that child migrants assimilate faster and better than adult
migrants.
The model estimates reveal four key findings. First, the exogeneity assumption of years
since migration results in an upward bias in the average rate of assimilation. After accounting
for the selective timing of migration, the average rate of assimilation drops from 1 percent to
0.6 percent. Second, there is a remarkable degree of variation in the individual-specific rates
of assimilation. They vary from negative 10 percent to 7.1 percent. Third, the estimates
predict a strong negative correlation between the individual-specific rate of assimilation and
immigrant quality. This finding suggests that relative to high quality immigrants, low quality
immigrants invest more in human capital after migration and, consequently, they have a
higher rate of assimilation. Thus, we observe a catch-up effect between low-quality and high-
quality immigrants. These findings are consistent with the theoretical predictions of Duleep
and Regets (1999) and Borjas (1999). The Immigrant Human Capital Investment (IHCI)
model of Duleep and Regets (1999) predicts that immigrants who have less transferable
skills would have a lower opportunity cost of acquiring human capital in the host country.
Thus, immigrants with less transferable skills are more likely to invest in human capital after
migration and, thus, they have a higher rate of assimilation. Also, the immigrant human
capital accumulation theory of Borjas (1999) predicts a conditional convergence if there is
“relative substitutability” between pre-migration human capital and post-migration human
capital.
Fourth, the estimates show a positive correlation between the propensity to migrate early
and the individual-specific rate of assimilation. This finding can imply two mechanisms:
(1) immigrants who have a higher propensity to migrate early, and, hence, migrate at an
early age, invest more in human capital post-migration or (2) expected growth in earnings
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influences the propensity for early migration and, subsequently, the timing of migration. In
either case, the timing of migration and wage assimilation are interdependent - a finding that
validates the paper’s hypothesis and highlights the need to estimate these equations jointly.
The rest of the paper is organized in five sections. Section 1.2 presents a simple theoretical
model of the timing of migration that explains how individuals decide the optimum period
of working life to spend in the host-country so as to maximize expected lifetime earnings.
Section 1.3 illustrates the endogeneity problem in years since migration variable and develops
the joint model of the timing of migration and wage assimilation. In Section 1.4, I discuss the
data and variables used to estimate the joint model. Section 1.5 discusses model estimates.
Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Theoretical Model of Timing of Migration
In this section, I present a simple model that explains how immigrants decide the time
of migration (age at migration) which in turn determines the length of the working life
spent in the host country. In the model, individuals decide the optimal time of migration
that maximizes the net expected lifetime earnings. The migration event is assumed to be
an absorbing state; that is, once the individual migrates to the host country, she does not
out-migrate until the end of the working life.5
A related model was presented by Zimmermann and Constant (2012) that illustrates the
role of age in migration decisions. My model differs from their model in two major ways.
First, I introduce the role of skill transferability in the migration decision. As skills are not
perfectly transferable over international borders, individuals can only market a fraction of
their pre-migration skills. The degree of skill-transferability is the fraction of pre-migration
skills that are valuable in the host-country. The degree of skill transferability is allowed
to vary by the age at migration, the time spent in the host country and other exogenous
5This assumption is only for simplification and can be relaxed. Please refer to Dustmann and Go¨rlach
(2016) for a discussion on temporary migration.
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factors. Thus, we gain insight into how differences in exogenous factors which affect the
skill-transferability affect the marginal cost of migration and the optimum time of migration.
Second, as the model involves maximization of lifetime earnings (and not utility), I only focus
on working age individuals and working life period.
Model Set-up The individual begins working in the origin country at age ab which is
also the first time she decides whether to migrate or not. The working life spans from ab to
A. The individual works in the home country from ab till the time of migration am and in
the host country from am until A. Thus, the total working life spent in the host country is
A − am. The average wage per unit of human capital H in the origin country is wo and in
the host country is wh. Wages in both origin and host country are a function of individual’s
age.
Individuals can only market a fraction of their pre-migration skills δH in the host coun-
try’s labor market where 0 < δ ≤ 1. The degree of skill transferability δ varies with the
age at migration am, the time in the host country a − am and other exogenous factors γ.
Country of origin, ethnicity and other exogenous factors captured by γ only contribute an
additive shift in the degree of skill transferability and their effect does not change with the
time of migration. Migration involves a one time cost C that varies by age at migration.
For simplicity, it is also assumed that there is no accumulation of formal human capital
post-migration.
The present value of net lifetime earnings for an individual who migrates at am and
discounts future earnings by ρ is given by the following expression:
E(am) =
am∫
ab
e−ρawo(a)Hda− C(am)e−ρam
+
A∫
am
e−ρawh(a)δ(am, a− am, γ)Hda
(1.1)
where δ(am, a− am, γ) = δ0(am, a− am) + αγ
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The first term represents the discounted earnings in the origin country from ab to am. The
second term is the one-time cost of migration at age am and the third term is the discounted
earnings in the host country from am to A.
The optimal time of migration a∗m is given by equating the first derivative of Equation
1.1 with respect to am to zero:
E1(am) =e
−ρawo(a)H + ρC(am)e−ρam − C ′(am)e−ρam
− e−ρamwh(am)δ(am, 0, γ)H +
A∫
am
e−ρawh(a)(δ1 − δ2)Hda = 06
(1.2)
where the left hand side gives the marginal benefit and the right hand side gives the marginal
cost of migrating a year later. Rearranging Equation 1.2 yields the following expression:
e−ρawo(a)H + ρC(am)e−ρam − C ′(am)e−ρam
= e−ρamwh(am)δ(am, 0, γ)H −
A∫
am
e−ρawh(a)(δ1 − δ2)Hda
(1.3)
The marginal benefit includes the discounted wage in the origin country for an additional
year and the postponed cost of migration minus the change in cost of migration due to the
delay. There are two reasons why we might expect the change in cost C ′(am) to be negative
i.e. the cost of migration decreases with age at migration. First, selective immigration
policies that favor high-skilled immigrants make it easier for older immigrants to obtain a
work visa. Second, it might also be easier for older individuals to collect information about
migration process and job opportunities in the host country. Under such cases, delaying
migration would increase the marginal benefit from reduced cost of migration a year later.
The marginal cost includes the lost earnings in the host country at arrival (i.e. when
years since migration is zero) minus the change in the future stream of earnings in the host
country due to migrating a year later. It is assumed that δ1 < 0 i.e. the degree of skill
6δ1 and δ2 represent the derivative of δ with respect to am and a− am, respectively.
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transferability decreases with an increase in age at migration and δ2 > 0 i.e. the degree of
skill transferability increases with time spent in the host country. Thus, with increase in age
at migration, the change in future stream of earnings in the host country decreases and the
marginal cost increases.
There is substantial evidence that suggests δ1 is negative. For instance, Bleakley and Chin
(2004, 2008, 2010) show that younger aged migrants are more proficient in host-country’s
language, thus they perform better in the host-country’s labor market and are more socially
assimilated than their older counterparts.7 Similarly, Immigrant Assimilation Hypothesis
suggests that δ2 is positive. Duleep and Regets (1999) show that degree of skill transferabil-
ity increases with the investment in host-country specific human capital. As investment in
human capital post-migration depends on the time spent in the host country, skill transfer-
ability is expected to increase with time in the host country.
According to Equation 1.3, the optimal age at migration a∗m is chosen when the marginal
benefit equals the marginal cost of migrating. Migration does not occur if the marginal
benefit from delaying migration is always higher than the marginal cost. On the other hand,
if the marginal cost is always higher than the marginal benefit, the individual would choose
to migrate at the beginning of working life ab. The existence of an interior solution depends
on the discounting factor, the magnitude of wage loss due to skill transferability and the
change in the cost of migration from postponed migration.
Exogenous factors of skill transferability would also affect the optimal time of migration
through differences in earnings at arrival. Let γ capture cultural and linguistic similarity
between the origin and host country. Thus, the degree of skill transferability increases with
an in increase in γ, i.e., δγ > 0. To understand the effect of γ on a
∗
m, we take a derivative of
Equation 1.3 with respect to γ:
7They also asserted that these findings support Critical Period Hypothesis of language acquisition. Crit-
ical Period Hypothesis suggests that early ages are more suitable for language acquisition. So, younger
individuals can acquire a new language with less effort and earlier (less time-cost) compared to older indi-
viduals.
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E11(a
∗
m(γ), γ)
∂a∗m
∂γ
+ E1γ(a
∗
m(γ), γ) = 0 (1.4)
where
E1γ(a
∗
m(γ), γ) = −e−ρamwh(am)δγH (1.5)
As E11 < 0, E1γ < 0 and δγ = α , this implies
∂a∗m
∂γ
< 0 (1.6)
Thus, the model predicts that migrants from countries similar to the host country would
migrate at an earlier age.
From the theoretical model, it is clear that the time of migration is not randomly assigned
and hence years since migration in the host country is also not exogenous. In the next
section, I illustrate how the failure to account for selective timing of migration can lead to
an inconsistent estimate of the rate of wage assimilation.
1.3 Joint Model of Wage Assimilation and Timing of Migration
This section first discusses the implicit assumptions made when years since migration is
treated as an exogenous variable. Next, it develops a joint model of the timing of migration
and wage assimilation that relaxes these assumptions. The joint model also accounts for
selection into non-employment using inverse propensity weighting.
1.3.1 Problem of Endogeneity in Length of Stay
A typical empirical model of the economic assimilation of immigrants (refer to Chiswick
(1978), Borjas (1985, 1987) and Duleep and Regets (2002)) is estimated using the following
wage equation:
Wis = β0 + δY SMis + βXXis + φ(s) + Ci + ˜is (1.7)
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where Wis is the log of wage of individual i at time s, Xis is a vector of immigrant’s observed
characteristics in the host country that often includes age (or experience) and education,
Y SMis is years since migration (or length of stay) calculated as the difference between the
year of survey and the year of migration (Ys− Ym), φ(s) is a linear time trend capturing the
business cycle and Ci captures time-constant cohort-specific unobserved heterogeneity. A
few panel studies like Fertig and Schurer (2007) sometimes include time-constant individual
heterogeneity αi instead of Ci.
δ is the average wage return on spending a year in the host country instead of origin
country. Thus, δ represents the rate of assimilation where assimilation is defined in a way
similar to LaLonde and Topel (1992): “assimilation occurs, if between two observationally
equivalent persons, the one with greater time in the United States typically earns more”.
Thus, the base group is the immigrant herself and a positive value of δ indicates assimilation
within the immigrant group rather than with respect to their native counter-parts. In this
paper, I follow a similar definition of assimilation but estimate an individual-specific rate of
assimilation and not just the average.8 I discuss the estimation of individual-specific rate of
assimilation in Section 1.3.3.
Previous studies have treated Y SMis as exogenous. However, there are several reasons
why this leads to biased estimates. To understand them, let us consider an individual’s
migration decision Mi(a) at age a:
Mi(a) = 1[MBi(a)−MCi(a) >= 0]
where MBi(a) = f(Zi(a), νi) and MCi(a) = g(Zi(a), νi)
(1.8)
and Mi(a) = 1 =⇒ Mi(a− 1) = Mi(a− 2) = ......Mi(14) = 09 (1.9)
In Equation 1.8, individual i migrates at age a if net expected earnings are maximized i.e
8In Jain and Peter (2017), we consider immigrants’ rate of assimilation with respect to natives using
GSOEP data and find a wage divergence.
9I assume, the earliest age an individual decides to migrate is at the age of 14, i.e., the earliest age an
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the marginal benefit of migrating MBi(a) equals the marginal cost of migrating MCi(a)
where MBi(a) and MCi(a) are functions of factors of migration Zi(a) and the unobserved
propensity of migration νi. However, as explained in Equation 1.9, Mi(a) = 1 implies that
the individual chose not to migrate at an earlier age. Thus, the migration decision at age a
not only depends on net expected lifetime earnings but also on past migration decisions.
In Equation 1.7, δ is consistent only under the following assumptions: (1) the decision
to migrate at a is random and thus Cov(Y SMis, ˜is) = 0 which means the unobserved
propensity of migration is uncorrelated with the error in the wage equation, i.e., Cov(νi, ˜is) =
0 or (2) the timing of migration only has a constant effect on wages (through Ci or αi) and
no effect on the rate of assimilation through δ, i.e., Cov(νi, αi) 6= 0 but Cov(νi, δ) = 0
The first assumption is unrealistic and contradicts the theoretical evidence provided in
Section 1.2. The second assumption implies that timing of migration does not affect the
rate of assimilation. Please note that the rate of assimilation is essentially the return on
acquisition of human capital (not necessarily formal) with every additional year of stay in
the host-country. According to the second assumption, an immigrant who arrived at the
age of twenty and thirty would have the same incentive to invest in host-country’s human
capital during their stay in the host-country. In light of empirical evidence that people tend
to invest more in human capital during the early period of the life cycle, this assumption is
quite restrictive.
Moreover, as depicted in the theoretical model, the degree of skill-transferability is a
function of age at migration and influences the stream of earnings in the host country. In
fact, Schaafsma and Sweetman (2001) and Friedberg (1992) have shown that age at migration
affects earnings level. This effect possibly reflects differences in post-migration education.
Furthermore, if we believe that a forward-looking rational individual not only cares about
the wage level but also the trajectory of wages during their stay in the host-country (δ), the
migration propensity νi in Equation 1.8 would be correlated with δ in Equation 1.7.
individual can begin working.
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With this in mind, I explicitly model the timing of migration and account for selective
timing of migration in estimating the rate of wage assimilation. Subsection 1.3.2 presents
the hazard model used to estimate the timing of migration and Section 1.4 discusses the
push-pull factors of migration included in the hazard model.
1.3.2 Timing of Migration
I model the timing of migration using a parametric continuous-time proportional hazard
model for future immigrants, i.e., those individuals who eventually migrate. Although, the
data are available in yearly intervals, I treat time as continuous since the hazard model is
estimated over a long period of time, specifically from 1960 to 2013. Another reason for
choosing a proportional hazard model over a discrete-time logistic regression is the benefit
of defining a flexible baseline hazard.10 Moreover, most of the literature on joint estimation
of survival and linear mixed models has assumed time to be continuous. I postpone the
discussion of the joint models in existing literature in subsection 1.3.4.
As mentioned earlier, the timing of migration equation and the wage assimilation equation
are estimated only for individuals who eventually migrate. The equation is given as:
λi(t) = λ0(t) exp(Xi(t)
′βX + Ei(t)′βE + ci)11
where ci ∼ N (0, σ2c )
(1.10)
where λi(t) is the instantaneous rate of migration given the individual did not migrate earlier.
Thus, it captures the whole history of migration decision process as well as the conditional
10However, I refrain from choosing a non-parametric baseline hazard (as is the case in a traditional Cox
model) as parametric models perform better when data suffer from left-truncation (Hancock and Mueller,
2010).
11This is a generalized form of the Proportional Hazard model. Notice that Ei(t) and Xi(t) include time-
varying explanatory variables, thus the hazard ratio will not be constant over time as is the case with the
traditional Proportional Hazard model. This random effects hazard model is commonly represented in the
following manner:
λi(t) = λ0(t)ηi exp(Xi(t)
′βX + Ei(t)′βE)
where ηi = exp(ci) is the shared frailty.
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dependence. Xi(t) is a vector of individual’s observed characteristics (both time-constant
and -varying) and Ei(t) is a vector of country-level push-pull factors of migration. As the
name suggests, push-pull factors of migration are exogenous factors of migration that push
the individuals out of the origin country and pull towards the host country. In Section 1.4,
I describe the chosen factors of migration included in Ei(t) in detail.
λ0(t) is the baseline hazard and is assumed to be a linear function of age (specifically age
minus 14). ci is the individual’s unobserved propensity of early-migration. As Equation 1.10
is only estimated for future immigrants, ci measures the unobserved propensity to migrate
early versus later. A higher value of ci implies that the individual has a higher propensity
of migrating early and thus a higher hazard rate λi(t).
Equation 1.10 is estimated for the years 1960 to 2014. Thus, individuals who turn 14
years of age before 1960 enter late in the hazard model estimation, specifically at 1960. Such
delayed entry or left truncation can be an issue in estimation of shared frailty models if
frailty ci is correlated with the truncation point. In estimation of Equation 1.11, I assume
ci to be uncorrelated with the truncation point. Given that delayed entry of individuals
(for individuals who turn 14 years of age before year 1960) is only due to lack of data
on migration push-pull factors for years prior to 1960, assuming no correlation between
frailty and truncation point is not restrictive. I also assume that E(ci, Xi(t)) = 0 and
E(ci, Ei(t)) = 0 which are standard assumptions in estimation of random effects model.
Also, the joint estimation is based on the assumption that every immigrant maximizes
her individual expected earnings. This assumption is common in empirical literature on
migration. However, in case of children, this assumption becomes unrealistic. The migration
decision for children is necessarily made at the household-level and not by the child herself.
Thus, I restrict the estimation sample to youth and adult immigrants, i.e., individuals who
migrated after the age of 14. So, the first time an individual faces the risk of migration is
at age 14. The waiting time from age 14 until the age at migration is the failure time of
migration Ti.
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1.3.3 Wage Assimilation
The wage assimilation equation estimated in this paper differs from Equation 1.7 in three
respects. First, I allow the rate of assimilation to vary by individual. Second, I account for
time-constant individual unobserved heterogeneity ai instead of cohort-specific unobserved
heterogeneity Ci. And third, I allow correlation between time-constant individual unobserved
heterogeneity ai and individual specific rate of assimilation. Thus, Equation 1.7 transforms
into the following linear mixed model:
Wis = β0 + (δ + bi)Y SMis + βXXis + φ(s) + ai + is (1.11)
where δ is the fixed coefficient on Y SMis and gives the average rate of assimilation. bi is
the random slope on Y SMis and gives the individual-specific variation from the average rate
of assimilation rate. Thus, individual i ’s rate of assimilation is (δ + bi). ai, the random
intercept, captures time-constant unobserved individual heterogeneity and is allowed to be
correlated with bi.
Unlike Equation 1.7, the linear mixed model given by Equation 1.11 can estimate mean as
well as random coefficient ofz Y SMis. It also allows the random intercept ai to be correlated
with the random slope bi. Moreover, we can estimate the average return on time-constant
observable characteristics on wages, which is not possible with fixed effects model.
The individual-specific random intercept ai captures the heterogeneity in unobserved
quality of immigrants. It allows each immigrant to have her own initial point of wage
trajectory. Borjas (1987) found significant differences in initial earnings between arrival
cohorts and argued that these differences reflect differences in unobserved ability between
cohorts. However, a competing argument was put forward by Duleep and Regets (2002) who
showed a negative correlation between cohort-specific initial earnings and assimilation rates,
i.e., cohorts with higher initial earnings had slower rates of assimilation and vice versa. Thus,
they suggested that initial earnings indicate the degree of skill-transferability rather than
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ability. As a higher degree of skill-transferability is associated with a higher opportunity
cost of investing in host country specific human capital (in terms of foregone earnings), the
rate of assimilation is expected to be slower for immigrants who can easily market their
pre-existing skills in the host country’s labor market. I discuss the interpretation of ai in
depth in Section 1.5 and for now refer to ai as immigrant quality.
The random slope bi on Y SMis captures differences in return on post-migration invest-
ment in human capital between immigrants. It allows each immigrant to have her own wage
trajectory. Unobserved differences in post-migration investment in human capital can be due
to differences in the level of effort or due to other unobserved individual characteristics. For
instance, some immigrants might enroll in language training or employment training after
migration which helps them perform better in the host-country’s labor market. Thus, they
receive a higher wage return on an additional year of stay in the host-country. However, a
higher rate of assimilation could also imply that the immigrant has a people-friendly person-
ality and a great deal of perseverance which helps her progress in the workplace. bi allows
us to capture such differences unlike the average rate of assimilation δ.
The correlation between the random slope bi and the random intercept ai accounts for
unobserved individual characteristics that affect both the wage level and the wage trajectory
with respect to the length of stay. I do not have any prior expectation of the relationship
between ai and bi. Their correlation can be positive or negative depending on what immigrant
quality signifies. For instance, high-ability individuals would have a higher wage level and
are also expected to easily acquire the host country specific human capital. Thus, we expect
a positive correlation between ai and bi. However, if a high value of ai means a higher degree
of skill-transferability, then we expect ai and bi to have a negative correlation, i.e., people
with high degree of skill-transferability have a lower incentive (and also a higher opportunity
cost in terms of foregone earnings) to invest in human capital after migration. Regardless of
the direction, we need to account for the correlation between ai and bi.
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1.3.4 Joint Estimation
In this section, I present the joint model of the wage assimilation and timing of migration
equations. I first explain the timeline of a typical immigrant and then develop the likelihood
function of the joint density of wages and timing of migration {log(Wis), Ti}.12
Timeline The timeline of a typical immigrant is given in Figure 1.1. It specifies the
portion of migrant’s life cycle estimated using the timing of migration equation and wage
assimilation equation. Every prospective migrant at age of 14 decides to migrate or not for
the first time. Timing of migration equation is estimated from the age of 14 up till the year
of migration Ym. Wage equation is estimated for the years the individual participates in the
survey. Notice that it is not necessary each migrant is surveyed in the year of arrival. Thus,
estimation of wage assimilation is from the first year of survey Yf until the migrant drops
out of the survey Yd. The length of stay is calculated as the difference between the age at
survey year as and age at migration am. Note that age at survey year is a function of birth
year Yb and survey year Ys i.e as = Ys − Yb. Similarly, age at migration am is a function of
year of birth and year of migration Ym, i.e., am = Ym − Yb. Thus, length of stay as − am
equals (Ys − Yb)− (Ym − Yb) = Ys − Ym.
Joint Likelihood Function For convenience and clarity, I reproduce the timing of mi-
gration and the wage assimilation equation below, explicitly indicating the random effects
a, b, and c:
λi(t) = λ0(t) exp(Xi(t)
′βX + Ei(t)′βE + ci) (1.12)
Wis = β0 + (δ + bi)Y SMis + βXXis + φ(s) + ai + is (1.13)
In these equations, the unobserved propensity of early-age migration (ci), the quality
12Ti is the waiting period from age 14 till migration, i.e., Ti = am − 14 where am is the age at migration.
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Figure 1.1: A Typical Immigrant’s Timeline
Year of birth Age = 14
Ym Yf YdYb1961 2014
First year
of survey
Migration period Observed wage
period
Year of survey
attrition
Notes: For the majority of the estimation sample, the period for which the migration hazard
is estimated does not overlap with the period for which wage equation is estimated. The
only exceptions are cases where the migrant is surveyed in the year of arrival, so Ym and Yf
is the same year. Only 0.67 percent of the sample was surveyed in the year of migration.
of an immigrant (ai) and individual deviation from the average assimilation rate (bi) are
correlated. As Section 1.3.3 points out, we need to account for correlation between ai and
bi. In a case where the propensity of early age migration ci is uncorrelated with ai and bi,
Equation 1.13 can be estimated alone to get a consistent estimate of δ, bi and ai.
However, as seen in Section 1.2 and further explained in Section 1.3.1, forward-looking
individuals consider lifetime earnings when making the migration decision, i.e., they care
about both the wage level and the wage trajectory during their stay in the host country.
Thus, it would be unrealistic to assume that the propensity of early-migration is independent
of ai and bi. The correlation between them allows me to capture time-constant unobserved
individual characteristics that affect ai, bi as well as ci. For instance, a risk averse individual
would have a low propensity to migrate early and would also be less likely to take risky
employment opportunities or job projects in the host country. Thus, both the labor market
performance in the host country and migration decision are affected by one’s level of risk
aversion. Similarly, innate ability of individuals could affect both the unobserved propensity
to migrate early and earnings in the host country. A high ability individual might have
a lower cost of migration and at the same time have higher earnings in the host country
relative to her low-ability counterparts. In such cases, wages in the host country depend on
the timing of migration and the random effects.
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The joint likelihood function of wages and timing of migration is given by the following
expression:
L(θ) =
n∏
i=1
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
{
S∏
s=1
f(Wis|Ti, ai, bi; θw)
}
×f(Ti|ci; θm)f(ai, bi, ci; θabc)daidbidci (1.14)
where
f(Wis|Ti, ai, bi;θw) = (2piσ2 )−1/2
× exp{−(Wis − β0 − βXXis − (δ + bi)Y SMis − φ(s)− ai)
2}
2σ2
(1.15)
f(a,bici; θabc) = ((2pi)
3|Σabc|)−1/2 exp{−1
2
(ai bi ci)
′Σabc−1

ai
bi
ci
} (1.16)
f(Ti|ci; θm) = [λ0(Ti) exp(Xi(Ti)′βX + Ei(Ti)′βE + ci)]
× exp{−
Ti∫
0
λ0(t) exp(Xi(t)
′βX + Ei(t)′βE + ci) dt}
(1.17)
f(Wis|Ti, ai, bi; θw) is the probability density function of wages in the host country condi-
tional on the timing of migration Ti and random effects ai, bi. As Y SMis is a linear function
of Ti (Y SMis = Ageis − 14− Ti), wages in the host country depend on the timing of migra-
tion. However conditional on a, b, c, and X, the distribution of wages and the distribution of
timing of migration are independent. This function can also be modified to include inverse
propensity weights to estimate weighted least square estimates. I include inverse propensity
weights for selection into employment in one of the specifications. I discuss in detail how the
weights are calculated in Section 1.3.5.
f(Ti|ci; θm) is the likelihood of migrating at Ti and not migrating prior to
Ti (i.e., hazard model with failure time Ti). The second expression in Equa-
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tion 1.17 exp{−
Ti∫
0
λ0(t) exp(Xi(t)
′βX + Ei(t)′βE + ci) dt} is the survival function from
age 14 until the age before migration and the first expression in square brackets,
λ0(Ti) exp(Xi(Ti)
′βX + Ei(Ti)′βE + ci), is the hazard function at the failure time, i.e.,
Ti. f(ai, bi, ci; θabc) is the multivariate normal density for the correlated random effects.
θabc, θm, θw denote parameters for random effects covariance matrix (Σabc), timing of mi-
gration equation and wage assimilation equation, respectively. For additional details on
estimation please refer to the technical appendix given in section A.2.
Joint Models in Existing Literature Joint longitudinal and hazard models are widely
used in biostatistics literature. The main application for the joint models is to assess the ef-
fect of a biomarker on a time-to-event such as death, drop-out from the study or re-occurrence
of an illness. Given these applications, the most common joint models in biostatistics are
Shared Random Effects Model (SREM). In these models, the random effect (or the unob-
served heterogeneity) in the biomarker directly enters the hazard model with an associated
parameter. Thus, either the hazard model does not have a frailty (or the unobserved het-
erogeneity in the hazard model) such as in Wulfsohn and Tsiatis (1997) and Crowther et al.
(2012) or the frailty is uncorrelated with the other random effects such as in Henderson et al.
(2000).
The correlated random effects model in which the frailty exists and is correlated with the
random effects in the longitudinal model are uncommon in biostatistics. And if implemented,
they usually use discrete-time hazard models such as in Touloumi et al. (1999). Correlated
random effects models are more frequently implemented in the economics literature. Com-
mon applications include the analysis of the effect of tenure or job seniority on wages or
employer provided health insurance. However, most of the papers in economics either use
only correlated random intercepts (and not random slopes) such as in Stinson et al. (2003) or
are implemented using discrete-time hazard models such as Abowd and Kang (2002). A few
rare exceptions include Lillard (1999) and Dostie (2005) both of which implement a similar
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joint model and analyze the effect of job turnover on wages.
The joint model developed in this paper is closest to the model developed in Lillard (1999)
but would be the first to analyze processes which do not happen simultaneously. The time
to migration precedes the process of wage assimilation in the host country. It must be noted
that the joint model developed in this paper has a few limitations. The first limitation arises
from the assumption of joint normality which is common among existing joint models. The
second limitation is that the joint model is highly parametric in nature, which is common
in most joint models like Lillard (1999) and Dostie (2005). The third limitation is that
presently the model only allows for one endogenous variable in the wage equation, which
is years since migration. And lastly, the joint estimation is computationally intensive and
leaves less room for experimentation.
1.3.5 Selection into Employment
The wage assimilation equation and, subsequently, the joint likelihood function is es-
timated for individuals who are employed and report positive wages. To account for non-
random selection in employment, I utilize two approaches. In the first approach, I exploit the
fact that unemployment among working-age male immigrants is relatively low compared to
their female counterparts and estimate the model only for males where employment selection
is not a severe issue.13
In the second approach, I estimate the joint model for both males and females while
applying inverse propensity weights (IPW) as explained in Wooldridge (2010) to estimation
of the wage equation. The weights are calculated by estimating the following Probit equation:
Pr(Sit = 1|Xit, Zit) = Pr(t > −α0 − α1Xit − α2Zit) (1.18)
where
13Out of a total of 8,000 migrants, 47.6 percent are men, of which 85 percent report positive wages. The
employment rate for women is only 65 percent.
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Sit =

1[S∗it > 0]
0[S∗it < 0]
and
S∗it = α0 + α1Xit + α2Zit + t; t ∼ N (0, 1)
S∗it is the latent variable that represents the utility from employment for individual i.
Thus, when S∗it > 0, the individual is employed and reports a positive wage, i.e., Sit = 1. Xit
is the vector of individual characteristics included in the wage equation. Zit is the exclusion
restriction that affects the employment decision but not an individual’s expected wage. I
discuss the exclusion restriction for selection into employment in Section 1.4.2.
Using inverse propensity weights requires the assumption of selection on observables or
conditional independence. However, this assumption is commonly used in the econometrics
and treatments effects literature. The benefits of using IPW is that it is flexible and less
computationally intensive to implement. Moreover, in the presence of endogenous sample
selection such as selection into employment, weighting produces consistent estimates and
helps in recovering population moments from a selected sample (Wooldridge, 2002)(Solon
et al., 2015). However, in case there are unobserved factors that affect both the selection
into employment and wage distribution, the model estimates would be affected.
1.4 Data and Variables
The joint model explained in the previous section is estimated using the data on im-
migrants in the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). It is the longest-running panel of
private households and persons in the Federal Republic of Germany. It is collected and
distributed by the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW Berlin. The survey began
in year 1984 and consists of 31 waves so far. After the fall of the Berlin wall in June 1990,
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residents of the German Democratic Republic were also included in the target population.
Thus, reference to Germany reflects the Federal Republic of Germany, commonly called West
Germany, from 1984 to 1989 and unified Germany from 1990 to 2014. In total, there are
15 samples and each sample was created using multistage random sampling clustered by
region-level. As SOEP over-samples immigrants, it is one of the very few panel datasets that
can be used in migration studies.
I next discuss selection of the final estimation sample, the creation of pre-migration
histories to estimate the timing of migration equation, and the variables included in the
wage assimilation and employment selection equations.
Sample Selection The major share of the estimation sample is drawn from three sam-
ples of the SOEP: specifically, sample B of foreigners in Federal Republic of Germany (FRG,
commonly called West Germany); sample D of immigrants in FRG; and sample M of im-
migrants in Unified Germany. Together, samples B, D and M constitute over 75 percent
of the estimation sample. Sample B, which was started in 1984, includes households where
the head of household is from either of the five Guest-worker countries (i.e., Turkey, Greece,
Ex-Yugoslavia, Spain or Italy). There are 1,393 households in sample B. Sample D includes
households with at least one member who migrated from abroad to FRG after 1984. Sample
M was started in 2013 and covers 2,723 households. It includes immigrants who migrated
after 1995 to unified Germany.
Of the initial survey sample, 5.1 percent were dropped due to missing values of the key
variables such as country of origin, birth year and year of migration. I also drop immigrants
who were living in the German Democratic Republic (GDR, commonly called East Germany)
before 1989 (which constituted 0.37 percent) because macro-level data on pre-migration
history is not available for GDR. Also, as mentioned earlier, the final estimation sample
excludes child migrants and only includes those who migrated at age 14 or higher.
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics of the estimation sample. On average, men
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and women have similar levels of schooling (around 10 years of total schooling). However,
women have considerably fewer years of work experience than males. The average work
experience for women is 12 years whereas men have a total work experience of around 22
years. This statistic indicates that the issue of selection into employment is more severe for
women than men. Women also, on average, have spent a year less in Germany than males.
Males and females are similar in terms of linguistic distance, parents’ education, and current
residence. Over 95 percent have a high linguistic distance, 70 percent have parents with a
basic secondary and vocational education, and almost 85 percent live in urban areas.
1.4.1 Variables in Timing of Migration Equation
The timing of migration equation (refer Equation 1.10) estimates the hazard rate of
migrating to Germany. The dependent variable is the age at migration minus 14. Figure 1.2
presents the distributions of age at migration for men and women. For both men and women,
the highest proportion of immigrants migrated between the ages of 20 and 30 (i.e during
the early years of working life). However, the distribution of female immigrants is more
dispersed than that of male immigrants. Non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival estimates,
Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard and smoothed hazard rates are also given in Figure 1.4.
These estimates suggest that women and men have a similar survival and hazard experience.
Since GSOEP surveys immigrants after they have moved to Germany, estimation of Equa-
tion 1.10 requires creating a pre-migration history of each migrant using the information on
year of migration and country of origin. The timing of migration equation has four sets of co-
variates: time-constant individual variables, time-varying individual variables, time-constant
macro-level variables and time-varying macro-level variables. The time-constant individual
characteristics include: an indicator variable if the immigrant is of German ethnicity, a cat-
egorical variable of the type of birthplace (city, small city, or rural), a categorical variable of
the highest education level of a parent, and the linguistic distance between immigrant’s na-
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tive language and Standard German language.14 The only time-varying individual variable
included in Equation 1.10 is pre-migration years of schooling. As this variable cannot be
directly obtained from the survey, I construct this variable using information on total years
of pre-migration schooling and assume continuous education from the age of six.
The time-varying and time-constant macro-level variables are the exogenous push-pull
factors of migration. These are collected from several sources and merged with the above
mentioned individual variables. Push factors are those that force individuals to leave their
home country such as lack of opportunities, unstable political environment and unsatisfac-
tory social development at origin. Pull factors, on the other hand, are factors that attract
immigrants to host countries such as better employment opportunities and higher standard
of living. The one-time cost of migration such as geographic distance can also influence
the decision to migrate. These factors of migration affect the decision to migrate without
directly affecting the labor market performance of immigrants in the host country. Hence,
they are the exclusion restrictions for the joint model given by Equation 1.14.15
The lack of socio-economic development at origin can push individuals to migrate whereas
better conditions at host country can attract migrants. To measure the time-varying relative
differences in economic development between origin and host country, I use GDP per capita
(constant in 2010 dollars) in both the countries. Also, since forward-looking individuals
care about not only the current but future economic growth in the host country, I include
predicted growth of per capita GDP in the next five years. As an indicator of the level of
social development, I also include life expectancy at origin country.
An unstable political environment, the risk of government collapse or wars can push
individuals to relocate to safer destinations. To include these push factors, I use a categorical
variable of political instability. At the same time, political factors such as inter-country
treaties can also facilitate migration between countries. Specifically for Germany, Guest-
14The measure of linguistic distance was constructed using the program provided by Max Planck Society
for the Advancement of Science and Information.
15Although, exclusion restriction are not necessary for identification as mentioned in Lillard (1999).
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worker treaties with Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Ex-Yugoslavia, for example, encouraged low-
skilled migration from these countries. Similarly, Schengen agreements and the formation of
the European Union has attracted immigrants to Germany from several European countries.
Keeping in mind the effect of such political factors on migration inflows, I include indicator
variables for Guestworker programs and whether a country is a member of European Union
in a given year. To capture differences in Germany pre- and post-unification, I also include
an indicator if Germany is unified in the specific year or not.
Apart from the already included linguistic distance, I include an indicator if the origin
and host country share a border. The geographic distance measures the monetary cost of
moving. Moreover, it also represents the effort cost of collecting information about the host
country, which is likely higher for prospective immigrants in geographically-distant countries.
1.4.2 Variables in Wage Assimilation Equation
Estimation of the wage assimilation equation, given in Equation 1.11, provides the rate
of wage assimilation (i.e., the wage return on an additional year of stay in the host country).
The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage rate. As can be observed in Figure 1.3,
the age-earnings profile of male and female immigrants are surprisingly similar but there is
a persistent earnings gap between male and female immigrants.
The wage assimilation equation is of a standard Mincerian form. Apart from commonly
included years of education and work experience, it also includes length of stay in the host
country and pre-migration characteristics. These pre-migration characteristics are the time-
constant individual characteristics included in the timing of migration equation. The wage
assimilation equation also includes an indicator for current urban residence and a quadratic
polynomial of the time trend.
I do not distinguish years of education or work experience by whether it was acquired
in the origin or home country. Although the returns on schooling and experience attained
in the host country is likely to be more valuable relative to that from origin country, I
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refrain from making such a distinction in the wage equation due to the lack of information
on actual schooling in the host country. While it is a common practice in the literature
to use approximated measures of pre- and post-migration schooling using total years of
schooling, age at migration and assuming continuous school attendance from the age of
6 (refer to Friedberg (2000), Bratsberg and Ragan Jr (2002) and Sanroma´ et al. (2015)
), including such measures creates measurement error and bias as pointed out by Duleep
(2015b). However, the joint model does account for time-constant individual unobserved
heterogeneity to account for endogenous total years of schooling.
Exclusion Restriction for Selection into Employment As explained in Section
1.3.5, the joint model uses inverse propensity weights to account for selection into employ-
ment when the model is estimated using both men and women. Estimation of the employ-
ment selection equation (refer to Equation 1.18) requires an exclusion restriction that affects
the employment decision but not the distribution of wages. I use average commuting distance
from home to workplace as an exclusion restriction similar to Jain and Peter (2016). Average
commuting distance represents a fixed cost of employment. Long commuting distance can
discourage employment, however it is unlikely to affect the wage distribution an individual
faces. The average commuting distance varies by state of residence and survey year. It is
computed using individual-level responses to three questions regarding commuting distance
(in kilometers) to the place of work. The detailed construction of the variable is given in the
Data appendix.
1.5 Model Estimates
In this section, I present the estimates for: (1) a separately-estimated timing of migration
equation, (2) a separately-estimated wage assimilation equation, (3) an equation for the
selection into employment equation and (4) the joint model of timing of migration and wage
assimilation. I also discuss the distribution of and correlations between immigrant quality,
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individual-specific rate of assimilation, and the unobserved propensity to migrate early.
1.5.1 Reduced Form Estimates
Timing of Migration The timing of migration estimates for men only and for the full
sample are presented in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. I estimate three specifications
of the timing of migration equation: a Weibull proportional hazard model, a Gompertz
proportional hazard model and a Cox proportional hazard model. The differences between
the specifications are different distributional assumptions about the baseline hazard. The
first specification assumes a Weibull distribution (i.e., λ0(t) = pt
p−1), the second assumes a
Gompertz distribution (i.e., λ0(t) = exp γt), and in the third, λ0(t) is left unspecified. Based
on the estimates in Tables 1.3 and 1.4, the different distributional assumptions do not seem
to affect the estimates.
Estimates are also consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model given in Section
1.2. The model predicts that individuals with a higher skill transferability would migrate
at an earlier age. We observe that ethnic Germans, who are likely to be familiar with the
culture and language in Germany and have a higher degree of skill transferability have a
higher hazard of early migration. On the other hand, individuals with a high linguistic
distance and, hence, a low degree of skill transferability migrate late. Estimates also show
that immigrants from geographically-distant countries such as in Asia and Africa have a
lower hazard of early migration compared to immigrants from Europe. Apart from the cost
of migration, immigrants from Asia and Africa are also less likely to be familiar with German
culture and customs. Hence, immigrants from these continents have a lower degree of skill
transferability and, consequently, migrate later.
Among the pre-migration individual characteristics, the education levels of both the im-
migrant and her parents decrease the hazard of early migration. Thus, individuals from a
better socio-economic family background and with higher education levels choose to migrate
late. On the other hand, the type (rural versus urban) of birthplace does not have a statis-
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tically significant effect. The estimates of country-level factors of migration are statistically
significant and in line with our expectations: immigrants from countries that share a border
with Germany (contiguity) or those with a Guestworker treaty have a higher hazard of early
migration whereas immigrants from origin countries with a higher annual GDP per capita
have a lower hazard of early migration.
Interestingly, at any given point of time, the GDP per capita in Germany increases the
hazard of early migration but the future economic growth in Germany decreases the hazard.
This finding indicates that prospective immigrants postpone migration if they expect a higher
economic growth in Germany in the next five years. The estimated effect of political violence
at origin is a bit surprising. The hazard of early migration does not monotonically increase
with an increase in the level of political violence. Immigrants migrate early when either there
is a low level of political violence or there is a war outbreak. The recent Syrian refugee crisis
is a testament to how a war can push people to migrate. However, it is puzzling to find that
a medium intensity of political violence at origin decreases the hazard of early migration. A
possible explanation is that individuals keep postponing the migration in the hope that the
situation at origin will improve in the near future.
Wage Assimilation The estimates of the wage assimilation equation for men and for the
full sample are presented in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, respectively. I present three specifications of
the wage assimilation equation: ordinary least squares, random effects and a linear mixed
model. For the full sample, the wage assimilation equation uses inverse propensity weights
obtained from estimating a selection into employment equation (except for the random effects
specification, which does not allow using weights).
Table 1.5 presents the results for the Probit equation for the selection into employment.
The equation estimates are presented for both the full sample (specification I) and men
only (specification II). The effects of average commuting distance to workplace are negative
and statistically significant in both the specifications. As expected, women have a lower
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probability and ethnic Germans have a higher probability of employment. The employment
probability increases with the number of years of education and work experience, but de-
creases with years since migration. Immigrants with a high linguistic distance compared
to those with a zero linguistic distance have a lower employment probability. A surprising
result is that immigrants whose parents had higher education are less likely to be employed
relative to immigrants whose parents had little or no education.
The estimates of the rate of assimilation in Tables 1.6 and 1.7 are quite similar across
the three specifications. The linear mixed model, however, has a slightly higher rate of
assimilation than the ordinary least squares and random effects specifications. An additional
year of stay increases the hourly wage by less than one percent. This estimate might seem
low; however, it falls within the wide range of estimates that have been reported for various
countries. There is no consensus in the literature on the magnitude of the average rate of
assimilation. For instance, Borjas (1989), using a longitudinal data for immigrants in science
and highly professional occupations in United States, found no evidence of assimilation.
However, Borjas (1994) used US census data and found the rate of assimilation in the range
of 0.7 to 2.1 percent. For United Kingdom, Dustmann and Fabbri (2003) find the rate
of assimilation between 3.0 to 3.2 percent. For Germany, Isphording and Otten (2014) use
SOEP and find the average rates of assimilation between 2.1 to 1.1 percent. Dustmann (1993)
also found a 1.4 percent earnings return on years since migration for temporary migrants.
Thus, the reduced form estimate of the average rate of assimilation is comparable to the
estimates found by other studies on Germany.
1.5.2 Joint Model Estimates
The results using joint model, shown in Table 1.8, resemble the reduced form estimates
of the timing of migration. We observe that the hazard of early migration increases when
the host and origin countries share a border. This estimate validates the high volume of
migration observed between neighboring countries in the world such as between the United
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States and Mexico. The immigrants from origin countries that had a Guest worker treaty
with Germany have a higher hazard of early migration. On the other hand, immigrants
from member countries of European Union migrate late. Also, immigrants are more likely
to migrate after the fall of the Berlin wall in a unified Germany.
Similar to the reduced form estimates, we observe that migrants from Asia and Africa
are less likely to migrate early relative to European migrants. Also, a low level of political
violence and war outbreak increases the hazard of early migration, but a medium level of
political violence does not. Among individual characteristics, high linguistic distance, a
rural place of ubpringing, and pre-migration years of schooling decrease the hazard of early
migration. Being an ethnic German, on the other hand, increases the hazard.
The estimates of wage assimilation using the joint model (see Table 1.9) show that the
reduced form estimates of the rate of assimilation are biased upward. We observe that the
estimate of the average rate of assimilation from the joint model is nearly half of what is
suggested by the linear mixed model and is closer to the ordinary least squares estimate
(refer to Table 1.6). The average rate of assimilation in the joint model is 0.6 percent
whereas the linear model predicts it to be 1 percent. Thus, the failure to account for
selective timing of migration overestimates the actual rate of assimilation. This upward bias
is a result of the unaccounted correlation between the propensity of early migration and
the individual-specific rates of assimilation. Because the unobserved propensity to migrate
early and individual rates of assimilation are positively correlated (refer to Table 1.10),
individuals who have a high propensity to migrate early also have high rates of assimilation.
Moreover, the individuals with a high propensity to migrate early would appear for a longer
duration in the dataset as these individuals migrated at an early age. Thus, the sample
disproportionately contains more observations of individuals with a high rate of assimilation.
The upward bias is potentially a result of such sample selection.
As one would expect, years of schooling and work experience have a positive effect on
the hourly wage, by 3 and 2.5 percent, respectively. On the other hand, a high linguistic
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distance has a negative effect. Among pre-migration individual characteristics, a rural place
of upbringing and German ethnicity have a weak negative effect on the wage. However,
a better socio-economic status (as indicated by parent’s education) positively affects an
immigrant’s wage.
Immigrant quality, Individual Rate of Assimilation and Propensity of Early
Migration The distribution of the individual-specific rate of assimilation in Figure 1.6
shows individual rates of assimilation vary significantly between immigrants. This variation
may reflect the differences in the rate or quality of human capital acquisition after migration
among immigrants. Even though the average assimilation rate is 0.6 percent , the individual
rate of assimilation can be as high as 5 percent and as low as a negative 3.5 percent. Thus,
it is clear that the average rate of assimilation masks a remarkable degree of variation in
the individual-specific rates of assimilation. A negative rate of assimilation seems puzzling.
However, remember that there is a positive rate of return on the years of actual work ex-
perience. Thus, immigrant’s wages are not falling with an additional year but the return
for an additional year is lower. It is possible that the immigrants with highly transferable
pre-migration skills have a negative assimilation as found by Chiswick and Miller (2011). On
closer inspection, I do observe that negative assimilation mostly occurs for immigrants from
Guest-worker countries who could easily use their pre-migration skills in Germany.
Unsurprisingly, the immigrant quality and the unobserved propensity to migrate early
vary considerably between immigrants. The covariance structure (see Table 1.10 and Figures
1.8, 1.9, 1.12 and, 1.13) shows that immigrants of high quality (i.e., skill transferability) have
a lower rate of assimilation and vice-versa. This finding is consistent with the theoretical
predictions of the Immigrant Human Capital Investment (IHCI) model in Duleep and Regets
(1999). Their model predicts that immigrants with less-transferable skills would have a
lower opportunity cost of acquiring human capital in the host country. Thus, immigrants
with less-transferable skills are more likely to invest in human capital after migration and,
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consequently, have a higher rate of assimilation. Empirically, Duleep and Regets (2002)
have also shown an inverse relationship between the growth of immigrants’ earnings and
immigrants’ entry earnings, where entry earnings are used to proxy the immigrant quality.16
Borjas (1999) also predicts a negative correlation when there exists a “relative substi-
tutability” between pre- and post-migration human capital. If immigrants can utilize a
substantial size of the pre-migration skills in the host country, they would not face a high
initial disadvantage in the host country’s labor market. As a result, augmenting human
capital stock after migration would be more expensive. Borjas predicts that, in such a case,
immigrants would have slower wage growth.
The covariance structure also shows that immigrants who have a higher propensity to
migrate early, also have a higher rate of assimilation, thus, indicating a positive correlation.
This finding can be explained by two scenarios: (1) individuals with a higher propensity
to migrate early invest more in host country specific human capital, or (2) individuals who
expect a high wage growth after migration choose to migrate earlier. Although, we cannot
separately identify the relative importance of the two cases, it is clear that timing of migration
and wage assimilation are not independent.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper provides both theoretical and empirical evidence that the commonly-made
exogeneity assumption of years since migration in the host country is incorrect. It is the
first paper in the literature to develop and estimate a joint model of timing of migration
and economic assimilation. The joint model has two advantages: (1) it accounts for the
selective timing of migration; and (2) it estimates the joint distribution of individual-specific
rates of assimilation, immigrant quality, and the propensity to migrate early, and reveals the
correlation between these components.
Estimates from the joint model show that the unobserved propensity to migrate early and
16Similar findings were earlier reported by LaLonde and Topel (1991).
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individual rates of assimilation are positively correlated. Such findings validate my assertion
that the two processes must be estimated together. We also observe that individual rates of
assimilation are higher among immigrants who are of comparatively lower quality and have
lower skill transferability. Hence, a catch-up effect is observed between low-quality and high-
quality migrants. These findings address concerns about immigrant assimilation, especially
in recent times when several countries have received an influx of forced migrants. The model
predicts that, although forced migrants face an initial disadvantage in the host-country labor-
market, they rapidly invest in host-country-specific human capital and eventually reach their
potential.
My estimates also suggest that the commonly-estimated average rate of assimilation suf-
fers from an upward bias if the timing of migration is not accounted for. Moreover, we observe
that individual-specific rates of assimilation vary a great deal among immigrants. Clearly,
differences in the labor market performance of immigrants are due both to differences in
unobserved immigrant quality and to the tendency to acquire human capital post-migration.
To date, immigration policies have emphasized that when immigrants are screened it is im-
portant to identify individual ability. However, variation in rates of assimilation between
immigrants of similar quality indicates that host countries will be better served if they also
selected immigrants who have a higher incentive and an ability to augment their existing
stock of human capital after migration.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for Key Variables
Male Female Both
Years since migration 18.274 17.397 17.865
(9.078) (9.011) (9.057)
Total years of schooling 10.261 10.207 10.236
(2.269) (2.532) (2.395)
Years of actual work experience 21.908 12.023 17.302
(11.204) (10.653) (12.010)
Linguistic distance
Zero 0.009 0.011 0.010
Low 0.010 0.014 0.012
Medium 0.016 0.013 0.014
High 0.964 0.960 0.962
Ethnic German 0.219 0.263 0.239
Parents’ education
Basic Secondary and Lower Vocational 0.769 0.707 0.740
General secondary & upper vocational 0.162 0.197 0.178
Higher education 0.068 0.940 0.080
Place of Upbringing
City 0.344 0.378 0.360
Small city 0.235 0.243 0.239
Rural 0.420 0.377 0.400
Urban current residence 0.846 0.848 0.847
N 21,668 18,907 40,575
Notes: The summary statistics are given for the observations directly available from the survey and do not
include pre-migration histories. The missing category in ‘Parent’s education’ and ‘Place of upbringing’ are
not shown. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
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Table 1.2: Key Variables in Timing of Migration and Wage Assimilation Equations
Timing of
Migration
Wage Assimilation
Time-varying Macro Variables
GDP per capita at origin X
GDP per capita at host X
Growth of GDP per capita at host in
next 5 years
X
Life expectancy at home X
Political Instability at home X
Member of EU X
Guestworker treaty X
Unified Germany X
Time-constant Macro Variables
Origin country’s continent X
Contiguity X
Time-varying Individual Vari-
ables
Pre-migration schooling X
Total years of schooling X
Years since migration X
Actual years of work experience X
Type of current residence X
Time-constant Individual Vari-
ables
Female X X
Ethnic German X X
Linguistic distance X X
Type of birthplace X X
Parents’ education X X
Notes: The wage assimilation equation also includes a second order polynomial of time trend and squared
term of actual years of work experience. Political Violence, home country’s continent, type of birth place,
linguistic distance and parents’ education are categorical variables. Member of EU, guestworker treaty, uni-
fied Germany, contiguity, ethnic German and type of current residence are indicator variables. Indicator for
female is included when the joint model is estimated for both males and females.
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Table 1.3: Timing of Migration: Reduced Form Estimates for Men
Weibull Gompertz Cox
(I) (II) (III)
Pre-migration years of schooling -0.098*** -0.078*** -0.088***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Ethnic German 0.371*** 0.345*** 0.386***
(0.056) (0.061) (0.056)
Linguistic distance
Lowest -0.328 -0.455 -0.340
(0.286) (0.294) (0.280)
Medium -0.341 -0.345 -0.332
(0.218) (0.213) (0.211)
Highest -0.925*** -0.963*** -0.917***
(0.182) (0.172) (0.176)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational -0.108** -0.118** -0.126**
(0.051) (0.053) (0.049)
Higher education 0.069 0.043 0.038
(0.063) (0.064) (0.061)
Place of Upbringing
Small city -0.051 -0.033 -0.041
(0.052) (0.053) (0.050)
Rural -0.071 -0.050 -0.048
(0.046) (0.048) (0.045)
Continent of home country
Asia -0.769*** -0.781*** -0.777***
(0.122) (0.122) (0.119)
America 0.313** 0.324** 0.289**
(0.140) (0.146) (0.135)
Africa -0.279*** -0.221*** -0.260***
(0.070) (0.073) (0.069)
Political Violence
Limited 0.326*** 0.295*** 0.314***
(0.061) (0.061) (0.059)
Serious -0.746*** -0.728*** -0.760***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Warfare 0.243*** 0.173*** 0.218***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.059)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 1.3 continued:
Weibull Gompertz Cox
(I) (II) (III)
Unified Germany 0.302*** 0.335*** 0.340***
(0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Contiguity 0.258*** 0.281*** 0.260***
(0.081) (0.089) (0.080)
Guestworker treaty 1.181*** 1.239*** 1.188***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.063)
European Union -0.260*** -0.245*** -0.262***
(0.067) (0.068) (0.066)
Log of GDP per capita in origin country -0.390*** -0.414*** -0.391***
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044)
Log of GDP per capita in host country 1.110*** 1.075*** 1.120***
(0.146) (0.146) (0.144)
Economic growth in the next 5 years in host coun-
try
-0.122*** -0.109*** -0.109***
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Life expectancy in origin country 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant -11.430*** -9.910***
(1.425) (1.425)
N 39,113 39,113 39,113
Notes: A constant and a second order polynomial of time trend was also included in all specifications.
Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation”; in place of upbringing is
“Big or medium city” and in linguistic distance is “Zero distance”. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Adjusted R squared: 0.248 for specification (I). *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 1.4: Timing of Migration: Reduced Form Estimates for the Full Sample
Weibull Gompertz Cox
(I) (II) (III)
Pre-migration years of schooling -0.081*** -0.058*** -0.073***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Ethnic German 0.326*** 0.309*** 0.346***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.039)
Linguistic distance
Lowest -0.534*** -0.592*** -0.523***
(0.205) (0.209) (0.196)
Medium -0.230 -0.225 -0.224
(0.182) (0.181) (0.173)
Highest -0.852*** -0.857*** -0.843***
(0.155) (0.152) (0.147)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational -0.135*** -0.153*** -0.154***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.036)
Higher education 0.058 0.019 0.019
(0.045) (0.045) (0.043)
Place of Upbringing
Small city 0.004 0.014 0.012
(0.038) (0.038) (0.036)
Rural -0.023 -0.004 -0.004
(0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
Continent of home country
Asia -0.756*** -0.751*** -0.766***
(0.095) (0.094) (0.092)
America 0.076 0.088 0.058
(0.107) (0.111) (0.102)
Africa -0.320*** -0.282*** -0.310***
(0.049) (0.051) (0.048)
Political Violence
Limited 0.305*** 0.279*** 0.296***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045)
Serious -0.792*** -0.782*** -0.815***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Warfare 0.212*** 0.146*** 0.200***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.041)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 1.4 continued:
Weibull Gompertz Cox
(I) (II) (III)
Unified Germany 0.348*** 0.379*** 0.386***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046)
Contiguity 0.331*** 0.347*** 0.334***
(0.054) (0.057) (0.052)
Guestworker treaty 1.204*** 1.241*** 1.205***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.046)
European Union -0.342*** -0.335*** -0.350***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
Log of GDP per capita in origin country -0.297*** -0.315*** -0.291***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Log of GDP per capita in host country 1.544*** 1.503*** 1.553***
(0.113) (0.113) (0.111)
Economic growth in the next 5 years in host coun-
try
-0.048** -0.037* -0.039*
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Life expectancy in origin country 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Female 0.014 0.010 0.016
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026)
Constant -16.525*** -15.123*** . . .
(1.115) (1.107)
N 75,235 75,235 75,235
Notes: A constant and a second order polynomial of time trend was also included in all specifications.
Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation”; in place of upbringing is
“Big or medium city” and in linguistic distance is “Zero distance”. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Adjusted R squared: 0.248 for specification (I). *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 1.5: Probit Estimates for Selection in Employment
Full Sample Only Men
(I) (II)
Average commuting distance to work -0.024*** -0.032***
(0.004) (0.007)
Years since migration -0.005*** -0.016***
(0.001) (0.001)
Total years of schooling 0.050*** 0.049***
(0.003) (0.005)
Years of actual work experience 0.078*** 0.056***
(0.002) (0.003)
Years of actual work experience, squared -0.002*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
Linguistic distance
Lowest -0.221*** -0.390***
(0.081) (0.127)
Medium -0.073 0.078
(0.078) (0.122)
Highest -0.100* -0.162*
(0.059) (0.096)
German ethnicity 0.080*** 0.018
(0.016) (0.025)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational 0.011 -0.005
(0.019) (0.029)
Higher education -0.062** -0.071*
(0.027) (0.041)
Place of upbringing
Small city 0.164*** 0.219***
(0.017) (0.026)
Rural 0.087*** 0.108***
(0.015) (0.022)
Current urban residence 0.052*** 0.064**
(0.017) (0.025)
Female -0.446***
(0.014)
N 48,071 23,245
Notes: A constant and a second order polynomial of time trend was included in both the specifications.
Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation” and in place of upbringing is
“Big or medium city”. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Adjusted R squared: 0.101 for specification
(I) and 0.051 for specification (II). *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 1.6: Wage Assimilation Equation: Reduced Form Estimates for Men
OLS Random
Effects
Linear
Mixed
(I) (II) (III)
Years since migration 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Total years of schooling 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.026***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of actual work experience 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.022***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of actual work experience, squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Linguistic distance
Lowest 0.073 0.093 0.145
(0.049) (0.116) (0.126)
Medium -0.207*** -0.133 -0.111
(0.045) (0.097) (0.110)
Highest -0.349*** -0.352*** -0.352***
(0.035) (0.079) (0.089)
Ethnic German -0.005 -0.015 -0.001
(0.008) (0.016) (0.016)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational 0.017* 0.045** 0.047***
(0.009) (0.018) (0.018)
Higher education 0.075*** 0.150*** 0.144***
(0.016) (0.030) (0.032)
Place of Upbringing
Small city 0.009 -0.020 -0.028*
(0.007) (0.016) (0.017)
Rural -0.003 -0.015 -0.023
(0.006) (0.014) (0.015)
Urban current residence 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.081***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.019)
Constant 1.787*** 1.736*** 1.812***
(0.043) (0.098) (0.103)
N 17,264 17,264 17,264
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. A second order polynomial of time trend was also
included in all specifications. Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation”
and in place of upbringing is “Big or medium city”. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Adjusted R
squared: 0.166 for specification (I). *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 1.7: Wage Assimilation Equation: Reduced Form Estimates for the Full Sample
OLS Random
Effects
Linear
Mixed
(I) (II) (III)
Years since migration 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Total years of schooling 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of actual work experience 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.018***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of actual work experience, squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Linguistic distance
Lowest -0.044 -0.032 0.013
(0.034) (0.078) (0.082)
Medium -0.174*** -0.114 -0.071
(0.033) (0.071) (0.079)
Highest -0.244*** -0.283*** -0.251***
(0.022) (0.052) (0.057)
Ethnic German -0.037*** -0.028** -0.025**
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational 0.014* 0.041*** 0.034**
(0.007) (0.013) (0.014)
Higher education 0.069*** 0.137*** 0.122***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.023)
Place of Upbringing
Small city 0.011* -0.012 -0.014
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
Rural -0.012** -0.008 -0.009
(0.006) (0.011) (0.012)
Urban current residence 0.068*** 0.080*** 0.077***
(0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
Female -0.251*** -0.222*** -0.227***
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011)
N 29,712 29,712 29,712
Notes: Ordinary least squares and linear mixed models have been estimated using inverse propensity
weights. A constant and a second order polynomial of time trend was also included in all specifications.
Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation”; in linguistic distance is “Zero
linguistic distance”; and in place of upbringing is “Big or medium city”. Standard errors are given in paren-
theses. Adjusted R squared: 0.248 for specification (I). *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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Table 1.8: Timing of Migration: Joint Model Estimates for Men
Coefficient Std. Error
Pre-migration years of schooling -0.129 (0.011)
Ethnic German 0.381 (0.068)
Linguistic distance
Low -0.065 (0.261)
Medium 0.019 (0.210)
High -0.647 (0.109)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational -0.153 (0.065)
Higher education 0.043 (0.086)
Place of Upbringing
Small city -0.066 (0.054)
Rural -0.122 (0.054)
Continent of home country
Asia -0.311 (0.076)
America 0.285 (0.176)
Africa -0.750 (0.140)
Political Violence
Limited 0.421 (0.072)
Serious -0.667 (0.087)
Warfare 0.385 (0.071)
Unified Germany 0.686 (0.050)
Contiguity 0.342 (0.089)
Guestworker treaty 1.343 (0.008)
European Union -0.256 (0.056)
Log of GDP per capita in origin country -0.453 (0.011)
Log of GDP per capita in host country -0.032 (0.000)
Economic growth in the next 5 years in host country -0.328 (0.000)
Life expectancy in origin country 0.028 (0.000)
N 39,113
Notes: Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation” and in place of up-
bringing is “Big or medium city”; in linguistic distance is “Zero linguistic distance”. The standard errors
were computed by taking square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian. The Hessian was
computed numerically.
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Table 1.9: Wage Assimilation: Joint Estimates for Men
Coefficient Std. Error
Years since migration 0.006 (0.000)
Total years of schooling 0.030 (0.000)
Years of actual work experience 0.025 (0.000)
Years of actual work experience, squared 0.000 (0.000)
Ethnic German -0.012 (0.014)
Linguistic distance
Low 0.261 (0.093)
Medium 0.028 (0.076)
High -0.221 (0.064)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational 0.033 (0.010)
Higher education 0.134 (0.022)
Place of Upbringing
Small city -0.031 (0.014)
Rural -0.022 (0.012)
Urban current residence 0.087 (0.014)
Time trend 0.014 (0.000)
Time trend, square 0.000 (0.000)
Constant 1.625 (0.066)
N 17,264
Notes: Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation” and in place of up-
bringing is “Big or medium city”; in linguistic distance is “Zero linguistic distance”. The standard errors
were computed by taking square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian. The Hessian was
computed numerically.
Table 1.10: Variance-Covariance Structure of Immigrant Quality, Propensity of Early-
Migration and Individual Variation from Average Rate of Assimilation: Joint Model Es-
timates for Men
Parameter Std. Error Parameter Std. Error
σa 0.431 (0.006) ρab -0.776 (0.000)
σb 0.021 (0.000) ρac 0.074 (0.000)
σc 0.490 (0.001) ρbc 0.185 (0.000)
Notes: Immigrant quality is denoted by ‘a’, individual variation from the average rate of assimilation by
‘b’, and propensity to migrate early by ‘c’. The standard errors were computed by taking square root of the
diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian. The Hessian was computed numerically.
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Table 1.11: Timing of Migration: Joint Model Estimates for Full Sample
Coefficient Std. Error
Female -0.006 (0.041)
Pre-migration years of schooling -0.106 (0.008)
Ethnic German 0.500 (0.053)
Linguistic distance
Low -0.786 (0.242)
Medium -0.557 (0.320)
High -1.357 (0.158)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational -0.190 (0.046)
Higher education 0.075 (0.059)
Place of upbringing
Small city -0.021 (0.051)
Rural -0.081 (0.040)
Continent of home country
Asia -0.398 (0.082)
America 0.101 (0.163)
Africa -0.734 (0.172)
Political Violence
Limited 0.376 (0.045)
Serious -0.596 (0.053)
Warfare 0.550 (0.048)
Unified Germany 0.876 (0.040)
Contiguity 0.344 (0.070)
Guest-worker treaty 1.508 (0.054)
European Union -0.275 (0.052)
Log of GDP per capita in origin country -0.428 (0.041)
Log of GDP per capita in host country -0.001 (0.033)
Economic growth in the next 5 years in host country -0.299 (0.018)
Life expectancy in origin country 0.027 (0.001)
N 75,235
Notes: Omitted category in parents’ education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation” and in place of up-
bringing is “Big or medium city”; in linguistic distance is “Zero linguistic distance”. The standard errors
were computed by taking square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian. The Hessian was
computed numerically.
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Table 1.12: Wage Assimilation: Joint Estimates for Full Sample
Coefficient Std. Error
Years since migration 0.007 (0.000)
Female -0.221 (0.009)
Total years of schooling 0.028 (0.001)
Years of actual work experience 0.019 (0.000)
Years of actual work experience, squared 0.000 (0.000)
Linguistic distance
Low -0.027 (0.047)
Medium -0.100 (0.057)
High -0.289 (0.046)
Ethnic German -0.030 (0.010)
Parents’ education
General secondary & upper vocational 0.033 (0.011)
Higher education 0.114 (0.016)
Place of Upbringing
Small city -0.008 (0.011)
Rural -0.006 (0.010)
Urban current residence 0.082 (0.010)
Time trend 0.012 (0.000)
Time trend square 0.000 (0.000)
Constant 1.750 (0.047)
N 29,712
Notes: Omitted category in Parent’s education is “Basic secondary & lower vocation” and in Place of up-
bringing is “Big or medium city”; in Linguistic distance is “Zero linguistic distance”. The standard errors
were computed by taking square root of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian. The Hessian was
computed numerically.
Table 1.13: Variance-Covariance Structure of Immigrant Quality, Propensity of Early-
Migration and Individual Variation from Average Rate of Assimilation: Joint Model Es-
timates for Full Sample
Parameter Std. Error Parameter Std. Error
σa 0.446 (0.005) ρab -0.787 (0.007)
σb 0.021 (0.000) ρac 0.027 (0.015)
σc 0.530 (0.005) ρbc 0.142 (0.005)
Notes: Immigrant quality is denoted by ‘a’, individual variation from the average rate of assimilation by
‘b’, and propensity to migrate early by ‘c’. The standard errors were computed by taking square root of the
diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian. The Hessian was computed numerically.
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1.8 Figures
Figure 1.2: Histogram of Age at Migration by Gender
Notes: The earliest age at migration is 14 and the highest is 64.
Figure 1.3: Age-Earnings Profile by Gender
Notes: The estimates are calculated from ordinary least square regression of the log hourly
wage on a quadratic polynomial of age and its interaction with the indicator for female and
with robust standard errors.
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Figure 1.4: Non Parametric Estimates
Notes: The analysis time begins at age 14 and ends at age 64. Survival function is the
opposite of cumulative hazard function. Specifically, S(t) = exp
∫ t
0
λ(x)dx where Λ(t) =∫ t
0
λ(x)dx is the cumulative hazard function. Cumulative hazard is the sum of the risks you
face going from duration 0 to t. The smoothed hazard function is computed from taking the
derivative of the cumulative hazard function.
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Figure 1.5: Non Parametric Estimates
Notes: The analysis time begins at age 14 and ends at age 64. Survival function is the
opposite of cumulative hazard function. Specifically, S(t) = exp
∫ t
0
λ(x)dx where Λ(t) =∫ t
0
λ(x)dx is the cumulative hazard function. Cumulative hazard is the sum of the risks you
face going from duration 0 to t. The smoothed hazard function is computed from taking the
derivative of the cumulative hazard function.
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Figure 1.6: Distribution of Immigrant Quality and Individual-specific Rate of Assimilation:
Men Only Specification
Notes: The distribution was estimated by calculating Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of
immigrant quality ‘a’, individual-specific rate of assimilation ‘δ + bi’
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of Propensity to Migrate Early: Men Only Specification
Notes: The distribution was estimated by calculating Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of
propensity to migrate early ‘c’.
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Figure 1.8: Correlation between Immigrant Quality, Individual-specific Rate of Assimilation,
and Propensity to Migrate Early: Men Only Specification
Notes: Scatter plots of Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of immigrant quality ‘a’,
individual-specific rate of assimilation ‘δ + bi’ and, propensity to migrate early ‘c’.
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Figure 1.9: Correlation between Immigrant Quality, Individual-specific Rate of Assimilation,
and Propensity to Migrate Early: Men Only Specification
Notes: Scatter plots of Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of immigrant quality ‘a’,
individual-specific rate of assimilation ‘δ + bi’ and, propensity to migrate early ‘c’.
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Figure 1.10: Distribution of Immigrant Quality and Individual-specific Rate of Assimilation:
Full Sample Specification
Notes: The distribution was estimated by calculating Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of
immigrant quality ‘a’, individual-specific rate of assimilation ‘δ + bi’ .
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Figure 1.11: Distribution of Propensity to Migrate Early: Full Sample Specification
Notes: The distribution was estimated by calculating Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of
propensity to migrate early‘c’.
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Figure 1.12: Correlation between Immigrant Quality, Individual-specific Rate of Assimila-
tion, and Propensity of Early Migration: Full Sample Specification
Notes: Scatter plots of Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of immigrant quality ‘a’,
individual-specific rate of assimilation ‘δ + bi’ and, propensity to migrate early ‘c’.
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Figure 1.13: Correlation between Immigrant Quality, Individual-specific Rate of Assimila-
tion, and Propensity of Early Migration: Full Sample Specification
Notes: Scatter plots of Best Linear Unbiased Predictions of immigrant quality ‘a’,
individual-specific rate of assimilation ‘δ + bi’ and, propensity to migrate early ‘c’.
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Chapter 2: Limits to Wage Growth: Understanding the Wage Divergence
between Immigrants and Natives (with Klara S. Peter)
2.1 Introduction
The global economic integration and the string of recent humanitarian crises around the
world have spurred a lot of immigrant movement. While governments have been accept-
ing immigrants, there has been some opposition based on concerns around how well the
immigrants are going to assimilate into the society. Existing theoretical models of the im-
migrant human capital investment generally predict that immigrants will experience faster
wage growth than comparable natives due to lower cost of investment in human capital and
greater incentives to acquire more skills (Chiswick, 1978); (Duleep et al., 1999); (Borjas,
1999). This prediction has been put to test by numerous studies, which typically found a
fairly rapid rate of wage convergence. After accounting for non-random out-migration and
immigrant cohort quality, the degree of wage convergence becomes not as fast as it was
previously believed, but it remains positive (Borjas, 1995, 2015); (Lubotsky, 2007)).
This paper shows that positive post-migration wage growth and relatively large returns
to an additional year of stay in the host country do not necessarily result in wage convergence
between immigrants and natives. Using the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) from
1984 to 2014, we find substantial evidence of the increasing native-immigrant wage gap over
an individuals life-cycle.1 Not only the average wage of immigrants is smaller than that of
natives, the rate of wage growth is also significantly lower for immigrants compared to the
native population, which goes counter to the existing economics models. Currently, there is
no methodological framework that helps to explain the wage divergence between immigrants
1The evidence of wage divergence between immigrants and natives is also found in Italian data by Ven-
turini and Villosio (2008).
and comparable natives. This study attempts to fill this gap.
We extend the standard theoretical model of immigrant economic assimilation to allow
for the possibility of wage divergence and derive testable hypotheses. Our theoretical model
shows that wage divergence is possible if natives are relatively more efficient in the production
of human capital and/or if the price per unit of human capital increases over the life-cycle
at a higher rate for natives than for immigrants. We preserve the key features of Borjas
(1999) framework by allowing post-migration human capital accumulation to vary with the
level of pre-existing human capital, skill transferability, and the discounting factor of future
earnings.
We also develop and estimate the empirical model of wage convergence. The dependent
variable in this model is the average annual growth in relative wage over the five-year period.
Relative wage shows the position of an immigrant in the wage distribution of comparable
natives of the same age, schooling, and location type. This model was inspired by the
wage growth equation estimated in Borjas (2015). The dependent variable in his paper is
the assimilation rates aggregated from the U.S. Census data and measured as the 10-year
wage growth experienced by the immigrant cohort from a given country of origin relative to
the wage growth experienced by comparably aged native workers. Unlike the cohort-level
approach in Borjas’s study, our rates of assimilation are individual-specific and allowed to
vary with individual characteristics at arrival, post-migration investment, and characteristics
of home country at the time of entry. One of the advantages of the individual-level wage
growth model is that it accounts for permanent unobserved individual heterogeneity and yet
allows for estimating the effect of time-constant factors on wage growth.
In addition to using the long-term panel of individuals, this study benefits greatly from
the life history calendars provided by the GSOEP for each immigrant between the ages of
15 and 65. Based on the calendar data, we construct more accurate measures of pre- and
post- migration schooling and job training. Such information is rarely available in other
datasets. Most of the previous papers use highly crude measures of pre- and post-education
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based on total years of schooling and age-at-migration. As a result, these measures suffer
from measurement error, and using them can also generate systematic bias (Duleep, 2015a).
One important concern with including post-migration accumulation of human capital in
the wage convergence model is the potential endogeneity of new skill acquisition. Due to
the inherent difficulty of dealing with endogeneity, this issue has been largely avoided in the
migration literature. Skuterud and Su (2012) is the only study we are aware of that attempts
to address the endogeneity of post-migration schooling by including individual fixed effects in
the wage-level equation. Even though the permanent individual heterogeneity is accounted
for in the growth equation, the theoretical model predicts that individual decisions about
new skill acquisition may be based on anticipated wage gains, and thus new investment
could be endogenous in the growth equation. Using insights from the theoretical model, we
instrument post-migration formal schooling and job training by using pre-migration human
capital and supply shifters in government-sponsored training programs. Both the OLS and
IV-LATE estimates show that immigrants who underwent job training in the host country
have a higher rate of wage convergence, but only the IV-LATE estimator finds the positive
effect of post-migration formal schooling on wage growth.
We recognize that potential selection bias could be a problem in estimating the wage
growth model despite the growth-specification’s advantage over the level-specification in
accounting for permanent individual heterogeneity in selection. Generally, growth variables
cause a greater loss of valid observations in the estimation sample. For example, we use the
minimum of three non-missing data points in calculating the 5-year average rate of relative
wage growth. Missing data on growth rates may be related to out-migration, respondent’s
death, non-response at follow-up, exit from employment between the two survey rounds, or
wage non-reporting conditional on being employed.2 Using the Heckman-style correction and
2In the “level” specification of the wage assimilation model, several studies addressed selection bias due to
non-random out-migration and panel attrition (e.g., Bellemare (2007); Constant and Massey (2003); Dust-
mann et al. (2011); Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2015); Fertig and Schurer (2007)). Employment-related sources
of selection bias have been generally overlooked in the migration literature, although separate estimates of
employment assimilation rates are common (see review of studies in Kerr and Kerr (2011)).
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inverse propensity weighting procedures, our analysis shows that unobserved growth rates
from all the above sources of missing data do not contribute to the divergence of relative
wages conditional on skill groups. Only when the relative wage growth is unconditional,
i.e., when the immigrant is compared to any native worker regardless of skills, we find the
evidence of statistically significant negative selection based on time-varying unobservables.
Our estimates reveal that the rates of wage divergence tend to be higher among immi-
grants who are males, have less educated parents, are not ethnic Germans, acquire fewer
years of formal schooling in the home country, come from lower-income countries, and are
part of smaller ethnic networks. Immigrants who escaped political violence in the home coun-
try have higher assimilation rates, on average, although the effect of political instability on
relative wage growth is not always statistically significant. We also find the wage divergence
to follow the business cycle and decrease during the periods of economic growth. However,
compared to the U.S., where the average rate of economic assimilation is declining with time
(Borjas, 2015), Germany does not have a clear trend in wage divergence over calendar time.
Both wage divergence channels conjectured by the theoretical model namely, higher
efficiency of natives in the production of human capital and the discrimination of immigrants
in the labor market as a source for the native-immigrant price differential are consistent
with the data. The significantly lower assimilation rates during the early stage of working
career compared to later stages are in line with the efficiency story. Likewise, the strong co-
movement of life-cycle trends in perceived measures of discrimination and wage divergence
cannot rule out the discrimination story. Several other tests also fail to favor one hypothesis
over the other.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents a set of empirical facts
concerning the economic assimilation of immigrants in Germany. Section 2.3 develops a
simple theoretical model of wage growth that highlights the main channels behind economic
convergence/divergence in wages between immigrants and natives. Section 2.4 discusses the
empirical strategy for estimating the model of wage convergence, with a special emphasis on
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both measuring the factors of economic assimilation and addressing the selectivity issues.
Section 2.5 presents the estimates of the model of wage convergence, addresses the endogene-
ity of post-migration human capital, and tests for channels of divergence. Finally, Section
2.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical Evidence on the Economic Assimilation of Immigrants
In this section, we present a set of empirical facts concerning the economic assimilation
of immigrants in Germany. The facts are drawn from the statistical comparison of labor
market outcomes between immigrants and natives using the GSOEP, the annual panel of
households from 1984 to 2014.3 Since the GSOEP survey is well documented and widely
used, we provide data description in Appendix (refer to Section B.1) instead of the main
text. The immigrant status is defined based on the country of birth outside either East
or West Germany. For all analyses, we limit the sample of immigrants to those who were
between the ages of 17 and 65 at the time of survey and who arrived to Germany after 1960
at age 15 or older. Child immigrants are excluded from the analysis because pre-migration
history records begin from age 15. The sample of natives is only constrained by age 17-65.
Our estimation sample includes 39,829 natives and 7,800 immigrants.
2.2.1 Sample composition
From the sample composition of immigrants and natives shown in Table 2.1, we see
that the immigrant sample on average has a higher share of females by about 2 percentage
points, is 4 years older, acquired 1.1 years less schooling, and has considerably less educated
parents than the native population sample does. 86 percent of surveyed immigrants reside in
3GSOEP is a very popular data source in the migration literature, as it is one of a few national longi-
tudinal surveys with a large representation of immigrants. Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2015) highlight several
advantages of longitudinal datasets over frequently used synthetic cohorts, repeated cross-sections, and ret-
rospective panels on earnings linked to a single cross-section of households. The main advantage is the
unbiased identification of immigrant assimilation profiles conditional on proper modeling of the non-random
selection into employment and out-migration.
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urban areas and 98 percent choose to live in West Germany; the corresponding numbers for
natives are only 65 and 75 percent, respectively. All the above mean differences between the
two samples are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. An average adult immigrant
arrives to Germany at age 26 with 10 years of formal schooling and about 1 year of previous
job training and spends 19 years in the host country. A relatively small share of immigrants
receives formal schooling in Germany (only 14 percent) and post-migration job training (also
14 percent, most of whom attend short-term training programs for less than 2 years).
The composition of immigrants in the GSOEP reflects German migration history. Be-
fore the unification of Germany in 1990, top-sending countries were countries that signed
guest-worker recruitment agreements with Germany in the 1960s: Turkey (26 percent of the
sample of immigrants), Yugoslavia (15 percent), and Italy (13 percent). Immigrants from
Poland also had a large share (9 percent) due to the influx of Polish refugees in the 1980s.
After 1990, the German migration policy has shifted from guest-worker programs and family
reunification to the programs of resettlement of ethnic Germans mainly from the former
Soviet Union and East Europe. As a result, ethnic Germans from Russia and Kazakhstan
took the top two spots among new arrivals (16 and 14 percent, respectively). Shortly after
German reunification, the number of refugees climbed sharply, triggered by the Yugoslav
wars, perpetual series of wars in the Middle East, and other international conflicts. As a re-
sult, the share of immigrants from ex-Yugoslavia remains large even after 1990 (11 percent).
The overall share of immigrants from Middle East and North Africa (excluding Turkey) is
about 5 percent of the post-1990 arrival cohort, but this share is expected to rise in light of
the current migration crisis in Europe.4
4In calculating the percent shares in this paragraph, the longitudinal data is collapsed such that each
immigrant is counted once. The compositions of immigrants by year and county of birth in the GSOEP
sample and official population statistics are highly correlated (0.83). Some mismatch that arises due to the
idiosyncratic sampling of immigrants in GSOEP is adjusted by using probability sampling weights (see Data
Appendix in Section B.1 for further details).
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2.2.2 Labor market outcomes of immigrants and natives
Table 2.2 reports unconditional and “conditional on common covariates” mean differences
in the labor market outcomes between immigrants and natives. Each column represents one
of the three labor market outcomes, such as real hourly wage, the probability of being em-
ployed, and the probability of being unemployed conditional on being in the labor force.5
First, note that due to late arrivals the average immigrant enters the estimation sample at
an older age than the average native does. As a result, the comparison of unconditional
outcomes between the two groups could be misleading. For example, by looking at the raw
sample means, one can mistakenly conclude that the wage convergence has been achieved in
the German labor market, as immigrants earn a 2-percent higher hourly wage than natives
do. However, once the age is fixed using a flexible quartic polynomial function, the wage
gap between immigrants and natives turns out to be substantial. On average, the immi-
grant earns an 8 percent less hourly wage than the comparably aged native worker. The
gap exceeds 10 percent once we control for other observed characteristics such as gender,
years of schooling, urban current residence, location in West Germany, and year fixed effects.
Employment outcomes, even unconditional ones, are also considerably worse for immigrants
than natives. In the raw data, immigrants have a 7 percentage-point lower employment par-
ticipation rate and a 6 percentage-point higher unemployment rate than comparable natives
do. The conditional native-immigrant gap widens to 10 percentage points in employment
participation and almost 7 percentage points in the unemployment rate.
2.2.3 Wage returns to the length of stay since migration
When measuring the economic assimilation of immigrants in terms of their wage tra-
jectory in the host country, it is important to distinguish between the post-migration wage
progression relative to the immigrant’s own entry wage and the wage progression of immi-
5Further details on how each outcome is constructed are provided in Appendix in Section B.2.
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grants relative to natives; see Borjas (1999) for the discussion of two alternative definitions
of economic assimilation. These two definitions are associated with two different concepts of
wage convergence. The first concept, which is analogues to the beta-convergence in the macro
growth literature, implies the convergence of immigrants with low and high unobserved skills
towards each other when immigrants with lower entry wage (as a proxy for unobserved skills)
have a faster post-migration wage growth. The second concept of wage convergence implies
that the wages of immigrants are catching up with the wages of comparably skilled natives,
as immigrants spend more time in the host country. This second concept is the main focus
of our study.
Within the first conceptual framework, the average assimilation rate is typically obtained
as the slope coefficient on the number of years since migration in a standard wage equation
estimated over a sample of immigrants. By allowing the unobserved individual heterogeneity
to influence both the random intercept and random slope, we can test for the presence of
conditional wage convergence between low- and high-skill immigrants, as shown below.
wit = a0 + (δ¯ + bi)Y SMit + γXXit + γϕϕ(AGEit, T IMEit) + ai + εit (2.1)
where wit is the log of hourly wage of individual i at survey time t; Y SMit is the
number of years since migration; Xit is the vector of observed individual characteristics;
ϕ(AGEit, T IMEit) denotes a flexible function of the immigrant age and survey time; δ¯ is
the average wage return on spending a year in the host country; bi is the individual-specific
deviation from the average rate of assimilation with zero mean; ai is a random intercept
capturing immigrants’ unobserved skills with zero mean; εis ∼ N(0, σ2ε) is i.i.d. error inde-
pendent of ai’s and bi’s. Equation 2.1 belongs to the class of linear mixed-effects models
with correlated random intercepts and slopes. In the mixed model, ai and bi are assumed
to be drawn from the joint bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and the variance-
covariance matrix with elements σa, σb and σab. The negative covariance between the two
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random effects (σab < 0) implies that immigrants with lower unobserved skills have a faster
rate of wage assimilation, holding observed characteristics constant. Hence, the negative
correlation sign, if found, would support the hypothesis of conditional convergence between
low- and high-skill immigrants of similar observed characteristics.
We draw the distribution of the estimated returns to a year of stay in Germany in
Figure 2.1. The mean return is about 1 percent in annual wage gains. This estimate
is close to previously reported estimates for Germany (Basilio et al., 2009). Beyond the
mean estimates, we find significant heterogeneity in individual rates of the immigrant’s wage
progression; see left panel of Figure 2.1. Six percent of all immigrants experience an average
decline in real wage over the life cycle. Figure 2.1 also depicts a strongly negative correlation
between the best linear unbiased predictors of aˆi and bˆi (-0.77). These estimates are obtained
from a simplified mixed-effects wage model with the abbreviated list of controls. Jain and
Peter (2017) use a more refined joint hazard-longitudinal (JHL) model that accounts for the
endogenous timing of migration, non-random attrition, and the selection into employment.
The JHL model finds the average assimilation rate in Germany for the same period to be
lower, at about 0.7 percent increase in wage per each additional year of stay. Yet, this return
is substantial considering that the average adult immigrant spends almost 20 years in the
host country. The JHL model also finds the inverse relationship between unobserved skills
and the rate of wage assimilation (the coefficient of correlation is 0.83). However, as we
show below, the type-I wage convergence between low- and high-skill immigrants does not
imply that wages of immigrants as a group are converging to the wage level of their native
counterparts.
2.2.4 Relative wage profiles: first evidence of wage divergence
The positive slope on years since migration is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for the successful economic assimilation of immigrants. The wage convergence between
immigrants and natives is not going to be achieved if wages of natives grow at a faster
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rate than wages of immigrants. Let’s compare the life-cycle trajectories of the log of hourly
wage between immigrants and natives, shown in Panel A of Figure 2.2. Consistent with
the positive return to the length of stay in the host country, immigrants’ wages increase
over the life-cycle. Yet, natives have a much steeper age-wage profile and thus higher rates
of wage growth compared to the immigrant population (at least until about age 50). Wage
trajectories are striking and somewhat unexpected in that they are indicative of the diverging
wage trajectories between immigrants and natives. The “catching-up” effect found in some
U.S. studies (Borjas, 1999) does not show up in this figure.
In Figure 2.2A, we also observe that the average wage is higher for immigrants than
natives in the early work career. This result could simply reflect the compositional differences
between immigrants and natives. Indeed, once we control for basic observed characteristics,
the wage gap favoring younger immigrants vanishes, as we see from the life-cycle trajectory
of relative wage in Figure 2.2D.
In constructing relative wage, we first obtain the percentile values of the residuals from
the regression of native wages on the X vector in year t. Then, we predict residuals for each
immigrant and find the corresponding percentile θit in the residual distribution of natives.
Using this method, we obtain three measures of relative wage depending on specification of
the X vector: (i) unconditional if X includes only the intercept; (ii) age-specific if X also
contains a quartic polynomial in age; and (iii) conditional if X includes the level of schooling,
urban residence, and location in West Germany in addition to the intercept and a quartic
polynomial in age. In the latter case, θit is interpreted as the position of the immigrant in
the wage distribution of comparable natives with the same observed characteristics.
In Figure 2.2, we plot all three measures of relative wage over the life-cycle. The un-
conditional relative wage follows closely the trajectory of hourly wage for both immigrants
and natives. By construction, the native trajectory of age-specific and conditional wage lies
around the 50th percentile line. Small deviation arises from the parametric function of age
and aggregation. If we only condition on age, as shown in Panel C, the wage gap between
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immigrants and natives is close to nil at age 25, but it rapidly widens reaching an almost 8
percentile difference by age 55. If we also control for schooling and location, as in Panel D,
the wage gap appears to be statistically significant even during the early work career, and it
widens to a 7-percentile difference for ages 45 to 55. A slight uptick in immigrants relative
wages after age 55 reduces the gap to a 6-percentile difference by the end of working career.
In other words, despite a solid increase in wages after migration, the position of immigrants
in the wage distribution of comparable natives falls with age.
2.2.5 Selection into employment and survey participation
In Figure 2.3, we illustrate the life-cycle trajectories in employment outcomes. Similar to
wage differentials, there is a considerable native-immigrant gap in employment participation
rates (about 12 percentage points at age 40) and unemployment rates conditional on being
in the labor force (4.2 percentage points at age 40). The gap is also large for the probability
of exiting employment conditional on working in previous year; 6.7 percent of immigrant
workers and only 4.3 percent of native-born workers at age 40 lose their job annually. Tra-
jectories in unemployment probabilities show no sign of convergence. However, the gap in
employment participation and exit rates seems to be closing over time and achieving con-
vergence by the end of working career. The convergence in employment probabilities and
divergence in unemployment probabilities may co-exist if immigrants exiting employment
continue job search, while natives leave the labor force after quitting their job. Whichever is
the reason for observed trajectories in employment outcomes, there is a valid concern that
the time-varying unobserved propensity to work might be correlated with earnings profiles,
creating the problem of selection bias.
The selection issue is becoming even more concerning when we look at the survey attrition
probabilities, also shown in Figure 2.3. The attrition rate for natives is low and follows a
normal U-shape trajectory; the annual survey exit rates are about 6.4 percent at ages 30 and
50 and only 5 percent at age 40. However, the attrition rates for immigrants are considerably
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higher, with the annual survey exit rate falling between 10 and 18 percent. We do not know
the reasons for such high attrition. We can only speculate that, after a temporary stay,
many immigrants leave Germany for either their home country or an alternative destination.
If immigrants with less favorable prospects in the host country are more likely to leave,
the estimated earnings profiles are going to be biased upward. Conversely, the positive
selection into out-migration (e.g., if high-skill immigrants move away first) would produce
the downward bias in assimilation profiles; see Dustmann and Go¨rlach (2015) for excellent
discussion and derivation of biases due to non-random emigration. While our study focuses
mainly on wage outcome, we attempt to adjust wage convergence rates for selective out-
migration and selective propensity to work by using the Heckman selection correction and
inverse propensity weighting procedures discussed in Section 2.4.
2.3 Theoretical Model of Wage Convergence
In this section, we present a simple model of wage growth that highlights the main
channels behind economic convergence/divergence in wages between immigrants and natives.
2.3.1 Set-up
The model is based on the standard two-period model of optimal human capital accu-
mulation presented in Borjas (1999, 2015). Borjass model provides a good starting point
in explaining the economic assimilation of immigrants with preexisting human capital, skill
transferability, and skill complementarity in human capital production function. However, as
acknowledged by the author, the model always predicts a higher wage growth for immigrants
than for natives. Since immigrants are unable to transfer all of their human capital in the
host country, they have a lower opportunity cost of investing in human capital than natives.
As a result, immigrants invest more in acquiring human capital and experience faster wage
growth than comparable natives.
To make the model less restrictive in its predictions and better fitting with the empirical
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facts presented in the previous section, we extend the Borjass model in two major ways.
First, we allow the technology of human capital production to differ between migrants and
natives. It is quite possible that the lack of institutional/cultural knowledge and language
ability could make immigrants less efficient in producing human capital than natives, thus
leading to a lower rate of human capital accumulation among immigrants and lower wage
growth.
Second, we introduce price per unit of human capital and allow price to be different
between immigrants and natives.6These differences in prices for comparable skills may reflect
the lack of information about immigrants’ skills (statistical discrimination), distaste, or other
forms of labor market discrimination. If prices change differentially between the two groups,
this would also affect the optimal amount of investment made in human capital and in turn
affect the rate of wage growth.
The rest of the set-up is similar to Borjas (2015). An immigrant arrives to the host
country with a stock of pre-migration human capital K, of which τ can be transferred to
the host country. Thus, only τK can be used to produce earnings in the labor market. An
immigrant lives for two periods in the host country. During the first period, the immigrant
decides to invest pi of preexisting human capital towards production of new human capital
and during the second payoff period he experiences an increase in marketable skills by g×100
percent. The new human capital (gτK) is produced by investment in the first period (piK)
with the use of old human capital K as follows:
gτK = A(piK)iαKβ,with α < 1, (2.2)
where A is the human capital technology parameter; α and β are standard elasticity
parameters indicating whether new investment and old human capital are substitutable
(α + β < 1) or complementary (α + β > 1). Thus, the rate of growth of human capital can
6In the standard model, the market-determined rental rate for an efficiency unit is assumed to be one
dollar (Borjas, 1999).
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be conveniently expressed as:
g = Apiατ−1Kα+β−1 (2.3)
Individuals choose the optimal pi by maximizing the present value of their expected
earnings in the two periods. The first period earnings are:
pτK(1− pi) (2.4)
where p is the average price per unit of human capital in the first period, with p = E[pi].
In the second period, we allow for the average price to change at the rate of p˙. Thus, the
second period earnings are given by the following expression:
p(1 + p˙)τK(1 + g) (2.5)
Individual maximizes the present value of earnings over two periods to decide optimal pi:
PV = pτK(1− pi) + r[p(1 + p˙)τK(1 + g)], (2.6)
where r is the discounting factor. Plugging the expression (2.3) for g gives the following
expression for the present value:
PV = pτK(1− pi) + r[p(1 + p˙)τK(1 + Apiατ−1Kα+β−1)]. (2.7)
From the first-order condition, we derive the optimal value of pi assuming that the second-
order condition holds:
pi∗ =
[
rAα(1 + p˙)Kα+β−1
τ
] 1
1−α
(2.8)
and,
g∗ = [rα(1 + p˙)]
α
1−α
[
AKα+β−1
τ
] 1
1−α
=
pi∗
rα(1 + p˙)
(2.9)
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2.3.2 Immigrant wage growth
Now let w˙ denote the wage growth of immigrants between the two periods. Using equa-
tions (2.4) and (2.5) with first order Taylor series approximation,
w˙ = log
(
r[p(1 + p˙)τK(1 + g)]
pτK(1− pi)
)
≈ g + pi + p˙ (2.10)
We can express w˙ as a function of the endogenous decision variable pi,
w˙ ≈ ([rα(1 + p˙)]α + 1)pi + p˙, (2.11)
or, alternatively, in the reduced form,
w˙ ≈ ([rα(1 + p˙)]α + 1)
[
rAα(1 + p˙)Kα+β−1
τ
] 1
1−α
+ p˙ (2.12)
The last two equations will be needed later in justifying the estimation strategy. From
equation (2.12), we obtain the comparative static derivative of wage growth with respect to
parameters of interest.
sign
(
∂w˙
∂K
)
= sign(α + β − 1) (2.13)
∂w˙
∂τ
< 0 (2.14)
∂w˙
∂r
> 0 (2.15)
∂w˙
∂A
> 0 (2.16)
∂w˙
∂p˙
> 0 (2.17)
The first three results are described in greater detail in Borjas (2015). Briefly, equation
2.13 shows that high-skill immigrants experience higher wage growth only when their pre-
migration human capital is complementary with post-migration investment (α + β > 1).
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The next two equations (2.14) and (2.15) imply that the expected rate of wage growth is
larger for immigrants who have lower skill transferability τ and who put higher valuation on
future income (i.e., have bigger r). An example of the latter category of immigrants could
be refugees facing higher cost of return migration. Refugees may appreciate more their stay
in host country and be eager to invest in acquiring new human capital.
The fourth equation (2.16) implies that immigrants who are more efficient in human
capital production are likely to assimilate faster. This result allows for a more nuanced
prediction with respect to some common assimilation factors that appear in both τ and A.
For instance, close linguistic proximity of home and host countries may foster higher skill
transferability between two countries and lead to slower post-migration wage growth. At the
same time, fewer language barriers could make learning new skills more efficient and result
in higher wage growth via higher value of A. The same logic applies to ethnic networks. On
one hand, larger number of ethnic compatriots creates larger market for preexisting skills
and reduces incentives to invest into the new set of skills needed in the host country. This
corresponds to higher τ and lower w˙ in the model. On the other hand, larger, well-established
ethnic networks may have institutions in place to make the transition process smoother by
providing assistance in acquisition of new skills and thus increasing wage returns per unit of
investment (the positive A effect). In both examples, assessing the net effect on wage growth
becomes an empirical issue since theoretical model cannot pin down the direction of the net
effect.
Finally, equation (2.17) shows that wage changes are responsive to price innovations via
both the direct effect of p˙ on w˙ and the indirect effect of anticipated p˙ on investment decisions
pi∗ and subsequent growth in human capital g∗.
2.3.3 Wage convergence/divergence between immigrants and natives
So far, our theoretical discussion centered on immigrants’ own wage growth. While
own progress is an important aspect of the economic assimilation, the positive rate of wage
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growth does not imply that wages of immigrants are necessarily converging to the wage level
of natives, as we saw in the previous section. The relative wage progress of immigrants
compared to natives over life course is just as important, if not more important, concept of
economic assimilation. In the notation of our model, the primary statistic of interest here is
(w˙m − w˙n) or the difference in wage growth between immigrants and natives, where m and
n subscripts denote migrants and natives, respectively.
Let consider a comparable native who is deciding on further investment in human capital
and who is identical to an immigrant in terms of the level of pre-investment skills, price per
skill, and the technology of human capital production. The wage growth equation for the
native is determined by equation (2.12), apart from the skill transferability parameter τn,
which is equal to 1 since natives can use all preexisting human capital units K in the labor
market. In this case, the wage growth differential between immigrants and natives is always
positive:
sign(w˙m − w˙n)|A,K,p˙,r = sign
((
1
τm
) 1
1−α
− 1
)
> 0, τm < 1 (2.18)
Equation (2.18) implies that wages of immigrants and natives are converging over time,
with immigrants exhibiting higher rate of wage growth in host country, when contrasted
to comparable natives. However, relaxing the strict comparability assumption makes the
convergence prediction less obvious. Suppose natives have an efficiency edge in human
capital production due to better institutional/cultural knowledge, language proficiency, and
other favoring conditions, that is, An > Am. Then, the wage growth differential between
immigrants and natives, even if they have the same starting level of human capital K and
face the same price innovations p˙, is no longer unambiguously positive. Furthermore, the
wage divergence becomes possible if An/Am > 1/τm:
sign(w˙m − w˙n)|K,p˙,r = sign
((
1
τm
) 1
1−α
−
(
An
Am
) 1
1−α
)
Q 0 (2.19)
Similarly, the ambiguity in the wage growth differential emerges when the price dynamics
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is different between immigrants and natives. A mathematical expression for the relation
between (w˙m − w˙n) and (p˙m − p˙n) is long and complicated, as derived in Appendix B.4.
But if we fix the price change for one group (e.g., immigrants), then it can be shown that
∂(w˙m − w˙n)/∂p˙n < 0. In other words, the risk of wage divergence is increasing when price
innovations favor natives over immigrants.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we discuss the empirical strategy for estimating the model of wage con-
vergence, with a special emphasis on both measuring the factors of economic assimilation
and addressing the selectivity issues.
2.4.1 Empirical model of wage convergence between immigrants and natives
Using individual-level panel data, we build upon the aggregate cohort-level model of
wage convergence presented in Borjas (2015). The assimilation rates that Borjas employs as
a dependent variable are aggregated from the U.S. Census data. They capture the 10-year
wage growth experienced by the immigrant cohort from a given country of origin relative to
the wage growth experienced by comparably aged native workers. Unlike the cohort-level
approach in Borjass study, our rates of assimilation are individual-specific and vary with
individual characteristics at arrival, post-migration investment, and characteristics of home
country at the time of entry. Not only we can learn more regarding the sources of individual
variation in the rates of wage convergence/divergence over the life-cycle, we can also test
several hypotheses, including the role of post-migration investment in wage divergence, which
the cohort-level analysis cannot do.
If we ignore the issues of endogeneity and selectivity for a moment, the individual-level
model of wage convergence can be expressed in a single linear equation:
θ˙it = β0 + βFFit + betaϕϕ(AGEit, T IMEit) + uit (2.20)
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The dependent variable in this model is the average annual change in relative wage over
the next 5-year period, (θit = (1/5)
∑t+4
t (θit+1 − θit) for immigrant i at time t. Recall from
Section 2.2 that relative wage (θit shows the position of an immigrant in the wage distribution
of comparable natives of the same age, schooling, and location type. Alternative definitions
of the dependent variable may include different ways of differencing over time as well as
using other measures of relative wage.
One of the advantages of the individual-level wage difference model is that it differences
out permanent unobserved individual heterogeneity in the level equation, including all char-
acteristics of the immigrant at the time of arrival such as entry wage, age-at-migration,
unobserved skills, location at arrival, family background, pre-migration history unknown to
the econometrician, among others.7
The covariates that influence the trajectory of relative wage in Equation (2.20) include
a flexible function of the immigrant age and survey time, ϕ(AGEit, T IMEit), as well as
the vector of other observed factors of wage convergence, Fit, which comprises of individual
characteristics at the time of arrival, such as gender, ethnicity, and parents education; time-
varying individual characteristics in the host country, including post-migration investment
in human capital and location in Germany; characteristics of home country at the time of
arrival (e.g., linguistic proximity, GDP per capita, and political violence); time-varying home
country variable such as the size of ethnic networks; and time-varying destination country
characteristics such as economic growth in Germany. Next, we discuss the rationale for why
each variable is chosen.
2.4.2 Measuring factors of wage convergence
Our choice of convergence factors entering the vector Fit is guided mainly by the theoret-
ical model of wage convergence presented in Section 2.3. The model distinguishes between
7The first difference estimator has been previously used in the immigration literature with respect to
more aggregated units of analysis, such as cities (Altonji and Card, 1991), skill groups (Dustmann et al.,
2010), or arrival cohorts (Borjas, 2015).
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the endogenous choice variable pi indicating post-migration accumulation of human capital
and the set of exogenous factors (K, r, τ, A, p˙) influencing the wage growth of immigrants
directly or indirectly through pi; as shown by Equations (2.11) and (2.12).
We begin with measuring pi and K. The importance of splitting human capital into
pre- and post-migration components has long been recognized in the immigration literature
focusing on the wage returns to human capital (Bratsberg and Ragan Jr (2002); Chiswick
and Miller (1994); Ferrer et al. (2006); Sanroma´ et al. (2015); Skuterud and Su (2012)). Our
data allow us to separate schooling and on-the-job training acquired in the home country
from post-migration investment in the host country. We do it by using the age-at-migration
and annual spells of schooling and training between the ages of 15 and 65 (see Appendix B.2).
In the GSOEP data, we have three variables that may characterize preexisting human capital
K at the time of arrival: years of formal schooling, a dummy for received job training, and
the highest level of schooling completed by a parent. These variables are predicted to have
either positive or negative impact on immigrants wage convergence depending on whether
K is complementary or substitutable with post-migration investment, as in Equation (2.13).
In measuring pi, we observe whether the immigrant studied in the German school and/or
underwent job training after migration; both factors are predicted to have the positive effect
on wage convergence according to Equation (2.11).
The third factor is the valuation of future income (r), which in the model leads to more
human capital accumulation and higher rate of wage growth after the arrival. Although there
is no direct measure of this factor, previous studies suggest that immigrants who escaped
political instability and violence in their home country may place higher value on their future
in the new country, have a lower likelihood of returning home, and hence invest more in the
host country (Borjas (2015); Chin and Cortes (2015); Cortes (2004)). Following this line
of argument, we use the annual index of political instability in home country at the time
of arrival to differentiate between immigrants with different values of r. The index is pub-
lished by the Center for Systemic Peace (2015). It assesses major episodes of international,
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civil, and ethnic violence and warfare for almost 180 countries worldwide between 1946 and
2014. Based on the index of political instability, we split all country-year observations into
four categories: no episodes of political violence, limited political violence, serious political
violence, and warfare.
The fourth assimilation factor is the level of skill-transferability (τ), which is shown to
be inversely related to the rate of economic assimilation. Borjas (2015) posits that skills
of immigrants are more easily transferable between the two industrialized economies. We
use the log difference in real GDP per capita between home countries and Germany at the
time of arrival to capture the level of skill transferability. The underlying expectation is that
immigrants from a low-income country would have to invest more into the skills relevant to
the advanced host country and experience larger wage gains through acquiring new skills
and information. Other studies propose using linguistic distance/proximity between home-
and host-country languages as a measure of skill transferability (Chiswick and Miller, 2012).
Indeed, immigrants who grew up speaking the language that is distant from German face
higher cost in the transfer of their preexisting skills to the new labor market. A lower value
of implies a steeper earnings profile, according to Equation (2.14). The measure of linguistic
proximity is described in Appendix B.2. While capturing skill-transferability, both GDP per
capita and linguistic proximity may also depict the efficiency differences in the production
of human capital. For example, linguistic barriers could make immigrants less efficient in
learning new skills (i.e., have lower A), thus slowing subsequent wage growth. Lower levels
of economic development in the home country could be associated with poor school quality
and inadequate learning practices, which may hinder the effectiveness of new skill acquisition
in the host country. Empirically, we can test which channel (via τ or A) dominates.
A similar ambiguity arises with respect to the role of ethnic networks, which are often
measured as the share of total population from the same country of origin in each geographic
area or in a host country at large. Borjas (2015) argues that larger ethnic networks, by cre-
ating the demand for preexisting skills and improving skill transferability, reduce incentives
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for learning new skills and discourage socio-economic exchanges with natives. He documents
a significant negative effect of the number of preexisting immigrants from a given country
on a 10-year wage growth for new arrivals from the same country. This result is consistent
with the skill transferability channel. However, the positive assimilation effect of networks
via the efficiency channel is also plausible. Existing networks could be helpful to newcom-
ers in acquiring new skills through, for example, on-the-job training or shared information
about training opportunities. The access to formal education is likely to be less costly in the
areas with high concentration of immigrants due to scale economies. Therefore, the effect of
ethnic networks on human capital accumulation and subsequent wage growth is ambiguous.
In testing which channel dominates, we include the relative size of ethnic groups at the be-
ginning of the 5-year period (and alternatively at the time of arrival) as a covariate in the
wage growth model. The size is calculated as the share of foreign population by country of
origin in the total German population.
The effect of ethnic networks on the economic assimilation of immigrants can vary de-
pending on how old the networks are. Well-established networks may have institutions in
place for better social and economic integration of immigrants. Munshi (2003) shows that
individuals belonging to established networks have a higher probability of employment than
immigrants from relatively new networks. Hatton and Leigh (2011) also find that immigrants
from countries with long history of migration gain relatively more, however, the geographic
concentration of ethnic networks depresses earnings of immigrants. We check whether the
age of networks matters for wage assimilation by splitting our network measure into (i)
established networks based on the stock of immigrants from the same country of origin 5
years ago and (ii) recent networks measured as additional flows of immigrants from the same
country of origin during the last 5 years.
The average share of ethnic groups in the foreign-born population of Germany has been
on decline since the 1970s. We find that the Herfindahl index of ethnic concentration fell
considerably from 0.23 in the 1970s to 0.19 in the 1990s, 0.12 in the 2000s, and less than
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0.07 in 2015, thereby indicating increasing diversity of foreign-born population in terms of
origins. We publish these and other trends in macro indicators of home countries in web
appendix Figure B.1, where readers can see how political instability, linguistic proximity,
ethnic networks, and the home-host country GDP gap evolve over time. All considered home
country characteristics display substantial variation both over time (year of immigration) and
across countries of origin, which provides a fruitful testing ground for examining assimilation
hypotheses.
Individual-level data allow us to look at other sources of individual variation in wage
convergence rates. Although our theoretical analysis is constrained to the stylized setting
with limited factors, empirically we can test whether there are statistically significant differ-
ences in convergence rates by gender, age, urban residence, location in Germany (West vs.
East), and German ethnicity. The ethnicity factor could be linked to the theoretical model,
as it reflects both skill transferability and the efficiency of new skill acquisition since ethnic
Germans are likely to be more familiar with language and social institutions in Germany.
The last but not least factor affecting economic assimilation of immigrants in our model is
changes in prices of skills. The fundamental problem here is that skill prices are not directly
observed in the data. Therefore, price innovations favoring one group (e.g., natives) over
the other, after controlling for observed characteristics, are becoming an omitted variable
in Equation (2.20). Under the assumptions that post-migration price changes in the host
country are uncorrelated with pre-migration individual and home country characteristics,
we attribute the residual native-immigrant gap in wage trajectories to the unobserved price
effect. In Section 2.5, the residual gap will be related to several indicators of perceived
discrimination, which are available for a limited sample in some of the GSOEP rounds.
2.4.3 Selectivity bias and exclusion restrictions
When estimating the model of wage convergence as in Equation (2.20), the problem of
selection bias arises from missing data on the dependent variable. For simplicity of presen-
81
tation, let combine all exogenous covariates in Equation (2.20) into one vector Xit:
θ˙it = βXXit + uit, (2.21)
This empirical equation corresponds to the reduced-form theoretical Equation (2.12),
as it replaces the endogenous post-migration investment in human capital with the set of
exogenous assimilation factors. We assume that dropped observations with missing X’s are
ignorable or missing completely at random since the share of missing values in the X vector
is less than 5 percent of the raw data. However, the issue of non-random sample selection
due to missing dependent variable θ˙it cannot be ignored, particularly when the dependent
variable represents the growth or change. Growth variables may lead to a greater loss of valid
observations in the estimation sample, which could be related to out-migration, respondent’s
death, non-response at follow-up, exit from employment between the two survey rounds, or
simple refusal to report wage. In addition to traditional “static” selectivity bias due to non-
participation in the labor market at any given time, the non-random survey attrition and
employment exit between survey rounds, if correlated with uit, can cause the OLS estimation
of relative wage growth equation to be biased and inconsistent.
We use three alternative strategies to account for selectivity bias: inverse propensity
weighting (IPW), the Heckman 2-step procedure with the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), and
the full maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). All three approaches are based on the same
selection equation. Suppressing subscripts i and t for simplicity, let D be a selection dummy
variable, taking the value of one if θ˙it is observed and the value of zero if the dependent
variable is missing. Here, we do not distinguish between different reasons for missing data on
the dependent variable. The selection dummy is assumed to be linked through the indicator
function D = I(D∗ > 0) with the following latent index model:
D∗ = γZ + ν, (2.22)
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where Z is a vector of explanatory variables that are observed for all individuals; v is
the i.i.d. error term with mean zero and unit variance. The vector Z includes all variables
from the vector X as well as exclusion variables Z1 affecting the selection process, but not
included in the wage growth equation, under standard exogeneity assumptions, cov(Z1, ν) =
cov(Z1, u) = 0. Specifically, we use characteristics of the interview to predict survey attrition.
In GSOEP, we know the mode of interview in year t, such as face-to-face, computer assisted,
and self-written and mailed. We also know whether it was a first-time interview and for
subsequent interviews whether the same interviewer surveyed the household in year t as in
year t− 1. Interview characteristics are generally found to be good predictors of continued
survey participation. We also include the average annual growth of real GDP per capita in
the home country during the next 5-year period [t+ 1, t+ 5] as a potential factor influencing
the decision of immigrants to stay in the host country. The worse the economic conditions
in the home country, the higher would be the cost of returning home and the lower would be
the expected probability of out-migration (and thus the likelihood of survey drop-out in the
next year). Finally, we use the average commuting distance between home and workplace by
state-year. This variable serves as a proxy for fixed costs associated with work, and it is likely
to influence the employment participation decision. We note that the average commuting
distance is calculated for all workers, including natives, and it is one-year lagged relative to
future 5-year wage growth of immigrants. This is done in the attempt to mitigate potential
feedback effects of the immigrants wage growth on job density in the local labor market.
Once Equation (2.22) is estimated using the probit model, the IPW procedure applies the
weighted least square method to Equation (2.21), where the weights are given by the inverse
of Φ(Zγˆ); see Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Hirano et al. (2003), Wooldridge (2007). The
Heckman 2-step selection correction includes the inverse mills ratio, λ = φ(Zγˆ)/Φ(Zγˆ), in
the estimation of Equation (2.21) as an additional generated regressor. The MLE method
jointly estimates Equations (2.21) and (2.22) under the assumption that the error terms
in two equations (u, ν) are jointly normally distributed. The joint normality assumption
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is also required for the Heckman 2-step procedure, but it is not necessary for the IPW
method. However, the IPW method maintains unconfoundness or “selection on observables”
assumption, while the other two methods allow for “selection on unobservables”, which is
generally preferred.
2.4.4 Endogeneity of post-migration investment in human capital
The theoretical model of wage convergence makes it apparent that post-migration invest-
ment is endogenous. The immigration literature has not yet addressed this issue, except for
adding individual fixed effects in the wage-level equation (Skuterud and Su, 2012). The lat-
ter approach assumes that post-migration investment does not depend on decisions made in
the home country. Since investment in human capital is clearly sequential, endogeneity bias
is likely to be present not only in the level equation, but also in the difference (or demeaned)
equation.
We undertake two steps to address this problem. First, we use different time periods for
two processes to avoid immediate simultaneity: post-migration schooling and training are
acquired between a (arrival year) and t (current year) whereas the wage growth is observed
during the next 5-year period [t + 1, t + 5]. Second, we employ demand-supply shifters in
government-sponsored training programs as instrumental variables Z3. Specifically, using
annual statistics on the demand and supply of training contracts for the West and East
Germany separately, we construct the log of supply of training offers and the excess demand
for training at the arrival a and use them in the equation for wage growth during [t+1, t+5].
The excess demand is calculated as the difference between the log of unplaced training
applicants and the log of unfilled training places still registered with employment offices.
Figure 2.4 shows significant fluctuations in these measures over time. We assume that the
supply of training offers and the excess demand at arrival influence new skill acquisition in
the host country between a and t, but they are not forecastable based on future (residual)
long-term wage growth between t+ 1 and t+ 5.
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As we saw in Table 2.1, only 14 percent of immigrants receives formal schooling in
Germany and 14 percent acquires post-migration job training (5 percent has both). Most
immigrants with either post-migration schooling or training attend short-term programs for
less than 2 years. Given that the distribution of years spent on investment in post-migration
human capital is highly skewed, we dichotomize years into binary variables.
There are known problems with the consistency of 2SLS with dummy endogenous re-
gressors; see Angrist (2001). To account for both the endogeneity of binary variables and
selectivity, we take the following 4 steps recommended by Wooldridge (2010):
1. Estimate the probit model for the selection into non-missing wage growth as in Equa-
tion (2.22) and obtain the inverse mills ratio λ. Include exclusion restrictions for the
selection model Z1 and demand-supply shifters in government-sponsored training pro-
grams Z2.
2. Obtain predicted probabilities of acquiring any post-migration formal schooling pis and
job training piT ,
Gs(X,Z2, λ; γS) = Pr(pis = 1|X,Z2, λ)
GT (X,Z2, λ; γT ) = Pr(piT = 1|X,Z2, λ),
where X includes the same variables as in Equation (2.21); GS(.) and GT (.) are probit
models.
3. Estimate 2-stage structural Equation (2.23) by instrumenting endogenous pis and piT
with nonlinear fitted values GˆS, and GˆT .
θ˙it = β0 + βSpis + βTpiT + βXXit + βλλit + uit (2.23)
4. Bootstrap standard errors to obtain consistent standard errors.
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2.5 Results
We begin this section with discussing the dependent variable and providing summary
statistics for the covariates used in the model estimation. We then present the estimates of
the reduced-form specification of wage convergence using different treatments of selectivity
bias. The results with alternative measures of wage convergence and covariates are also
reported and compared. We also show the estimates of the structural equation (2.23) that
accounts for both selectivity bias and endogeneity of post-migration investment in human
capital. The section concludes with discussing two potential channels of the observed wage
divergence.
2.5.1 Dependent variable
In measuring the dependent variable the average annual change in relative wage we had
to make several choices. The wage measure is hourly, and it is calculated as the total net
income earned from employment last month in constant 2010 euros divided by the product
of actual working hours per week and the number of weeks in a month. Actual hours are
chosen over contractual hours because actual hours are available for the self-employed and
include over-time work. Between net income and gross income, we choose the former as
individual work and migration decisions are influenced by the net income. We only use non-
imputed income because earnings imputation can cause match bias, as shown by Bollinger
and Hirsch (2006). Observations with income imputed by the GSOEP are treated as missing
and modeled as part of the selection process.
The change in relative wage is calculated over the 5-year period. The 5-year interval
is not too short to be overly sensitive to transitory earnings shocks and the measurement
error. On the other hand, it is not too long to lose a significant number of observations
due to survey attrition and outmigration. Also, the average annual change over the 5-year
period θit = (1/5)
∑t+4
t (θit+1 − θit) is chosen over the 5-year difference (θit+5 − θit) to retain
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information from interim years, to mitigate noise in reported income and hours, and to
reduce the influence of temporary jumps/drops in wage rate. The minimum of three out of
five possible growth data points is used in calculating this variable.
Our preferred measure of the dependent variable is the change in conditional relative wage
of immigrants. Recall from Section 2.2 that conditional relative wage shows the immigrants
position in the wage distribution of comparable natives based on age, schooling, and location.
However, we also provide the estimates for absolute wage growth of immigrants and for the
change in unconditional relative wage.
The summary statistics for all three dependent variables is reported in Table 2.3. The
summary table also shows the mean and standard deviation of model covariates for the main
estimation sample with non-missing θit as well as for the expanded sample used in estimating
the probit selection model.
2.5.2 Reduced form model of wage convergence
Table 2.4 reports the baseline model estimates of Equation (2.20) for the change in
conditional relative wage using different methods of selectivity bias correction. Each column
represents one of the four specifications OLS, IPW, IMR, and MLE. The results are mostly
consistent across specifications, with only two notable exceptions. First, the IPW method
generates a larger negative effect of pre-migration training on wage convergence, while other
methods show no such effect. Second, the OLS and IPW methods estimate higher wage
convergence for female immigrants, while the other two methods which account for the
selection on unobservables do not find statistically significant gender differences in wage
convergence.
We find that only some measures of preexisting human capital are positively associated
with wage assimilation: accumulated years of pre-migration formal schooling in the home
country and having college-educated parents. This shows that immigrants coming from a
higher socio-economic background are more likely to experience wage convergence. The
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estimated positive coefficient on preexisting human capital may be indicative of the comple-
mentarity between pre- and post-investment in human capital, according to Equation (2.13)
in the theoretical section. On the other hand, job training received in the home country does
not seem to influence the immigrants rate of wage progression relative to natives.
Only one measure of skill transferability the linguistic proximity between home- and
host-country languages is estimated to have the negative effect on the relative wage growth,
as predicted by Equation (2.14). Closer proximity may weaken the incentives of immigrants
to invest in new skill acquisition in the host country. Yet, other variables that have been
traditionally used to measure skill transferability, such as GDP per capita in the home
country, the size of ethnic networks and German ethnicity, are all estimated to have the
positive effect on wage convergence. Although these results are not consistent with the skill
transferability explanation alone, they make sense according to the efficiency differences in
human capital production function. Higher GDP per capita in the home country might
be depicting better school quality or familiarity with educational institutions comparable
to Germany, which can make the acquisition of new skills and job search easier. Likewise,
larger networks may help immigrants in the assimilation process by disseminating valuable
information, providing contacts, and finding jobs with better growth prospects. Finally,
ethnic German resettlers who are likely to be better culturally assimilated may have an edge
in acquiring host-country skills. This would explain faster progression of their wages to the
level of natives, as compared to other ethnicities.
Another interesting observation comes from the age-related effects. As we saw earlier
in Figure 2.2, the wage divergence between natives and immigrants is highest during the
early adulthood, which is the period of human capital accumulation. This conclusion holds
after controlling for other assimilation factors, as shown in Table 2.4. Immigrants in the
youngest age group (17-25), who invest the most in human capital, exhibit the lowest rate of
wage convergence. This result is consistent with the efficiency differences in human capital
production as a driving source for wage divergence.
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The relationship between political instability and wage convergence is only weakly sig-
nificant, but the sign and coefficient magnitude are consistent with the prediction of our
theoretical model. Immigrants from warfare zones and countries with serious political vio-
lence, who are likely to be refugees and asylum seekers, assimilate faster. Generally, refugees
do not have an option of going back to their home country and value the future stream of
earnings in the host country. Their faster wage convergence could be related to stronger
incentives to invest more in host-country-specific human capital.
We also observe some spatial and temporal dispersion in wage convergence. Specifically,
immigrants in rural areas and West Germany have a faster rate of wage assimilation relative
to immigrants in urban areas and East Germany. The estimated coefficients associated
with year fixed effects do not follow any obvious time trend, as depicted by Figure 2.5.
Furthermore, the secular trend in wage convergence is flat, as can be seen in Figure 2.5.
This finding is different from the U.S. where the rates of economic assimilation has been
declining (Borjas, 2015). It could be that the convergence slowdown depicted by Borjas is
U.S. specific and not generalizable to other developed countries.
Finally, we notice that selection terms (inverse Mills ratio in IMR and the correlation
between the error terms in MLE) are not statistically significant. The divergence of relative
wages does not appear to be attributed to the selection effects associated with survey attri-
tion, out-migration, selection into employment, non-response, and other sources of missing
wage growth. Selection terms and inverse propensity weights have been constructed using
the selection equation given by Equation (2.22). The estimates from the selection equation
are reported in Table 2.5. All exclusion restrictions are significant predictors of the selection
into observed wage growth. The selection probability is lower for the first-time survey par-
ticipants and when the interviewer has changed from the previous round. Similarly, higher
future growth of per capita GDP in the home country decreases the likelihood of observ-
ing change in wage in the host country. This result is most likely due to out-migration in
response to better prospects in the home country. Expectedly, an increase in the average
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commuting distance to workplace significantly reduces the probability of employment and
non-missing wage growth. Apart from exclusion restrictions, we find that the probability of
observed wage growth is increasing with years of schooling in the host country and linguistic
proximity, which is expected. The selection probability is much higher for males, ethnic
German resettlers, middle-aged groups, and immigrants residing in the urban areas in West
Germany. All these results are intuitive. The only unexpected result is a lower probability
of being in the estimation sample for the immigrants who escaped political violence. Fur-
ther analysis reveals that this last result comes mostly from their lower likelihood of wage
reporting rather than higher survey attrition or employment exit, which could be related to
higher dependency of refugees on informal employment (Tumen, 2016).
2.5.3 Alternative Specifications
In Table 2.6, we present the estimates from 2-step Heckman model for two additional
dependent variables the absolute wage growth and unconditional relative wage growth. The
absolute wage growth is the 5-year period average growth of the log of hourly wage. The
unconditional relative wage growth is the 5-year average growth in immigrant’s percentile in
the unconditional native wage distribution of the log of hourly wage. We make several inter-
esting observations from the estimates of absolute and unconditional relative wage growth.
First, pre-migration years of formal schooling do not have a significant effect whereas pre-
migration job training has a significant negative effect. This negative effect indicates that
pre-migration and post-migration job training are substitutes. We also note that females
have a higher absolute and unconditional wage growth but not conditional wage growth.
Interestingly, the effect of age on absolute and unconditional relative wage growth is
opposite to that found for conditional relative wage growth. We find that compared to
an average native, immigrants’ wage growth decreases with age. This finding is consistent
with the human capital theory that predicts a concave age-earning profile. However, when
we compare immigrants to their native counterparts, we find that the wage convergence is
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higher for older immigrants. Thus, younger immigrants while may be enjoying a high wage
growth compared to an average immigrant but compared to a native who is identical to
them, they have a low wage growth. Many pre-migration factors such as parents’ education,
political violence at home country, linguistic proximity, and per capita GDP in the home
country behave alike across different specifications. Similar to the conditional relative wage
growth, absolute wage growth is also higher for immigrants who are part of a large network.
However, networks do not have a significant effect on unconditional relative wage growth.
Another important observation is that inverse mills ratio is significant and negative for
the absolute and unconditional relative wage growth. Thus, indicating that immigrants
who are selected in the sample have a negative wage growth. There can be two possible
explanations. First, the low employment probability of immigrants indicates the immigrants
have a hard time finding a job. Hence, it is quite likely that immigrants chose to work in
jobs where the wage growth is low and do not risk looking for better options. Essentially, it
appears that immigrants have a low bargaining power compared to their employers. Second,
immigrants, on average, are employed in low-skilled jobs that do not reward experience as
much as skilled jobs in which a higher proportion of natives are employed.
As mentioned in Section 2.4.2, immigrant networks can have a different effect on wage
convergence depending on if they are old or new. We test the sensitivity of wage convergence
(using 2-step Heckman method) to immigrant networks at arrival, at survey year and by
splitting the networks between old and new networks. The estimates, given in Table B.1 in
the appendix in Section B.3, show that networks at arrival and during the survey year have
identical effects. Interestingly, when we distinguish the networks based on if they are old and
new, we find that established networks have a significant positive effect on wage convergence.
However, the effect of new networks is positive, it is not statistically significant. This finding
is consistent with the findings reported by Munshi (2003) and Hatton and Leigh (2011).
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2.5.4 Post-migration accumulation of human capital
In this section, we discuss the estimates of the 4-step procedure explained in Section
2.4.4. In Table 2.7, Panel A shows the first stage and Panel B shows the final stage. The
first stage estimates reveal that the supply of training contracts and the excess demand of
training at arrival are significant predictors of investment in post-migration formal schooling
and job training. In the final stage, we find that the formal schooling acquired in Germany
has a significant positive effect on the relative wage growth. This finding is consistent with
other studies (Sanroma´ et al. (2015), Basilio et al. (2014)) that find high returns to education
acquired in the host country. The effect of post migration job training is also positive, but
not significant.
Interestingly we find that after controlling for post-migration human capital, pre-
migration schooling and job training do not have significant effect on relative wage growth.
This finding is consistent with several studies in previous literature: Sanroma´ et al. (2015)
for Spain and Basilio et al. (2014) for Germany find low rate of return on schooling obtained
in the home country. Furthermore, Kossoudji (1989) finds that returns to education are
close to zero for low skilled immigrants in United States. In light of such studies, it is not
surprising to find insignificant effect of pre-migration human capital on relative wage growth.
Another explanation for the insignificant effect of pre-migration human capital could be the
low transferability of human capital between developing and developed countries. In SOEP,
a sizeable proportion of immigrants are from developing countries and low socio-economic
backgrounds. For such immigrants, pre-migration human capital might not be very valuable
in the German labor market.
Among pre-migration factors we find that German ethnicity and parents’ education do
not have a significant effect on the relative wage growth. However, the estimates of the other
pre-migration factors such as political instability, linguistic proximity and per capita GDP
in the home country are similar to the baseline estimates. Immigrants from countries with
high political instability and per capita GDP have a higher relative wage growth. On the
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other hand, immigrants with a high linguistic proximity have a lower relative wage growth.
Among post-migration factors we find that relative wage growth is higher for immigrants
living in West Germany and rural areas. The relative wage growth also increases with an
increase in the size of immigrant networks.
Similar to the baseline estimates, we find that older immigrants have a higher relative
wage growth. This suggests that German employers value work experience more than ed-
ucation. Again, similar to the baseline estimates, we find that the relative wage growth is
not affected by the selection into employment, survey participation or the decision to stay
in Germany.
2.5.5 Channels of wage divergence
Given the estimates of the baseline and instrumental variables approach models, the
only factor that has a significant negative affect on the relative wage growth is linguistic
proximity. This evidence is not sufficient to justify the magnitude of the wage divergence
between immigrants and natives. As indicated by the theoretical model, there could be two
major channels of wage divergence: the relative differences between immigrants and natives
in the production of human capital and the growth in skill prices.
Younger individuals are more likely to invest in human capital. However, we consistently
find lower rates of relative wage growth for younger immigrants. The wage trajectories in
Figure 2.2 also show a higher wage divergence at younger ages. This finding supports our
hypothesis that immigrants are likely to have lower efficiency in human capital production
than natives. Also, the insignificant effect of pre-migration human capital on relative wage
growth indicates a low degree of complementarity between pre- and post-migration human
capital. Thus, immigrants likely find it difficult to acquire human capital in Germany.
Growth in skill prices, which is difficult to measure, is not part of our empirical models.
The growth in skill prices of immigrants might be affected by discrimination. However,
discrimination is also a difficult factor to measure. Fortunately, SOEP asks immigrants if
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they faced discrimination at workplace or in finding a job. But only a few (around 61%)
responded to this question. Another challenge is that the perceived level of discrimination is
endogenous. So, in Figure 2.6, we analyze the trajectories of perceived discrimination. The
concave trajectories show that discrimination is higher for younger immigrants, who also
experience a higher wage divergence (see Figure 2.2). Hence, the data suggests that both,
the lower efficiency and growth of skill prices could be potential channels of wage divergence
in Germany.
2.6 Conclusion
Our study finds strong evidence of the wage divergence between natives and immigrants
in Germany. The wage divergence is observed despite increasing average wage of immigrants
after their arrival in the host country. We introduce two channels of wage divergence into
the classic theoretical model of immigrant economic assimilation. The first channel is the
efficiency edge of natives over immigrants in the production of host-country-specific human
capital. The second channel is differentially changing prices per unit of human capital
favoring natives. Theoretical model also predicts that the rate of convergence increases
with lower skill transferability, higher valuation of future earnings, more post-migration
investment in human capital, and higher (lower) preexisting skills if they are complementary
to (substitutable with) post-migration human capital.
Empirical estimates are mostly in line with these predictions. The divergence of relative
skill-specific wages does not appear to be attributed to the selection effects arising from
survey attrition, out-migration, selection into employment, non-response, and other sources
of missing wage growth. After accounting for both the endogeneity of post-migration invest-
ment in human capital and selectivity bias, we find that obtaining a formal school degree in
the host country positively contributes to wage convergence. But additional years of formal
schooling and job training in the home country has no effect.
The analysis shows that the proximity of home-country language to host-country language
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a common proxy for skill transferability has a reducing effect on the economic assimilation
of immigrants. At the same time, several other proxies that have been traditionally used to
measure skill transferability, such as GDP per capita in the home country and the size of
ethnic networks are estimated to have the positive effect on wage convergence. While these
last results are not consistent with the skill transferability explanation alone, they make
sense according to the efficiency argument. Furthermore, the fact that the wage divergence
is highest during the first years of work career when people keep investing in human capital
also fits well the efficiency story, so as several other empirical tests that seem to be supportive
of the efficiency hypothesis.
The support for one channel of wage divergence does not imply the refutation of another
channel such as the rising differential in the price per unit of human capital due possible
discrimination of immigrants. As a matter of fact, we could not reject the potential role of
discrimination in wage divergence. Although the labor market discrimination is difficult (if
not impossible) to measure, the available subjective measures of perceived discrimination of
immigrants in the German society follow closely the life-cycle pattern of wage divergence.
The co-movement of perceived discrimination indices and wage divergence may not have
causal interpretation. But the fact that such relationship exists does not allow us to favor
the efficiency hypothesis over the discrimination one.
Among other notable findings, it is worth mentioning the wage convergence being pro-
cyclical. This implies that immigrants fare worse relative to natives during the periods of
recession, but they gain in relative wage during the periods of expansion. In contrast to
the U.S., where more recent cohorts have smaller rates of economic assimilation (Borjas,
2015), we do not find the slowdown of convergence rates in Germany over time. Another
interesting result is higher assimilation rates among immigrants who flee political violence
in the home country compared to those who come from politically stable countries, although
the standard errors associated with this result are large in some specifications.
Our analysis suggests that greater attention needs to be given to individual differences
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in assimilation trajectories. Despite the observed wage divergence for an average immigrant,
the substantial share of immigrants integrates well into the host-country labor market and
catches-up with natives, while many others lag substantially behind. Understanding the
individual differences can be crucial in the successful implementation of various integration
policies.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.1: Sample Composition
Panel A: Native-Immigrant Comparison
Natives Immigrants
Female 0.513 0.532
Age 41.048 45.218
(13.62) (10.99)
Adjusted years of schooling 11.309 10.211
(3.01) (2.53)
Parents education
Basic sec, lower vocational or less 0.435 0.633
General sec and upper vocational 0.378 0.179
Higher education 0.146 0.087
Unknown 0.041 0.1
Urban residence 0.651 0.855
West Germany 0.747 0.984
N 333,255 46,713
Panel B: Immigrants Only
At arrival Post-migration at
survey time
Ethnic German 0.136
Age at migration 26.275
(7.77)
Number of years since migration 18.943
(10.21)
Any formal schooling 1 0.14
Years of formal schooling 9.686 0.36
(2.67) (1.31)
Any job training 0.308 0.139
Short-term (¡ 2 years) 0.061 0.078
Mid-term (2-4 years) 0.199 0.044
Long-term (4+ years) 0.048 0.017
Years of job training 0.823 0.272
(1.44) (0.93)
Notes: Summary statistics is reported using sample weights (see Appendix A1). Standard deviations for
non-binary variables are provided in parentheses. Number of immigrants =7,800 [age 17-65, age at migration
15 or older, year of migration 1961-2014]; number of natives =39,829 [age 17-65]. Other sample constraints
are discussed in Appendix A1. Years of schooling in two panels are not comparable. Panel A uses the typi-
cal length of study in each completed level of education, while Panel B is based on actual years of schooling
reported in the retrospective calendar; see Appendix A2 for details.
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Table 2.2: Labor Market Outcomes of Natives and Immigrants
Log Hourly
Wage
Employment
Participation
Unemployment
Probability
Natives, mean(se) 2.108 0.7 0.072
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Immigrants, difference
Unconditional 0.018 -0.081 0.062
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conditional on a quartic in age -0.08 -0.119 0.061
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conditional on Xit -0.103 -0.098 0.068
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 214,080 333,255 252,091
Notes: Standard errors for the mean estimate are in square brackets. The p-values for the mean differ-
ence t-test are reported in parentheses. The difference is the for the labor market outcome between natives
and immigrants, with positive sign favoring immigrants. In addition to a quartic polynomial in age, also in-
cludes a dummy for being female, adjusted years of schooling, urban residence, location for West Germany,
and fixed effects for survey year. The unemployment rate is conditional on being in the labor force. The
construction of each variable is described in Appendix A2. The estimates use sample weights.
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Binary Variables Sample
A
Sample
B
Continuous Variables Sample
A
Sample
B
Pre-migration job train-
ing, a
0.344 0.307 Pre-migration years of
schooling
9.499 9.433
Post-migration schooling
[a, t]
0.135 0.126 (2.542) (2.485)
Post-migration job train-
ing [a, t]
0.151 0.129 Log of GDP per capita 9.201 9.136
Female 0.426 0.524 in home country, a (0.567) (0.600)
Ethnic German 0.17 0.144 Ethnic networks, t 1.223 1.221
Age group, t (1.037) (1.043)
26-35 0.179 0.176 Linguistic proximity 0.223 0.196
36-45 0.335 0.271 (0.193) (0.193)
46-55 0.376 0.302 GDP per capita growth in 1.516 1.474
56-65 0.086 0.211 Germany, 5-year MA
[t+1, t+5]
(0.648) (0.621)
Parents education GDP per capita growth in
home
1.887 2.277
Secondary education 0.12 0.127 country, 5-year MA [t+1,
t+5]
(3.792) (3.214)
Higher education 0.065 0.072 Average commuting dis-
tance, t
12.845 13.204
Unknown 0.105 0.116 (2.192) (2.162)
Urban residence, t 0.868 0.868 Log of supply of training
offers, t
13.234 13.236
West Germany, t 0.995 0.992 (0.149) (0.158)
Instability in home coun-
try, a
Excess demand for train-
ing, t
-0.124 -0.169
Limited political violence 0.085 0.091 (0.913) (0.955)
Serious political violence 0.048 0.076 Wage growth, 1.007 1.076
Warfare 0.081 0.115 5-year MA [t+1, t+5] (7.962) (17.433)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 2.3 continued:
Binary Variables Sample
A
Sample
B
Continuous Variables Sample
A
Sample
B
Mode of interview, t Change in unconditional
relative
0.269 0.255
Self-written and mailed 0.044 0.064 wage, 5-year MA [t+1,
t+5]
(4.909) (9.906)
Computer assisted 0.14 0.164 Change in conditional rel-
ative
0.019 0.016
Interviewer, t wage, 5-year MA [t+1,
t+5]
(5.703) (11.081)
First interview 0.085 0.095
Different interviewer 0.09 0.09 N of observations 13,521 37,691
Notes: Table shows the mean and standard deviation of variables in the two samples of immigrants. The
two samples are: (A) estimation sample with non-missing wage growth data and (B) extended sample, which
includes immigrants with missing wage growth data. Both samples end by 2009, which is the last year used
to compute wage growth in the next 5-year period (this is the main reason for the difference with Table 1).
Standard deviations are in parenthesis and not reported for dummy variables. Superscript a indicates the
year of arrival, t denotes the year of survey, MA is moving average. Base/omitted categories are age 17-25
for age groups, basic secondary and lower vocational for parents education, no episodes of political violence
for instability in home country, face-to-face interviews for the mode of interview and the same interviewer.
All variables are described in Appendix A2. Summary statistics is reported using sample weights (see Ap-
pendix A1).
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Table 2.4: Baseline Specification, Reduced Form
OLS IPW IMR MLE
Pre-migration years of schooling 0.075*** 0.055* 0.080*** 0.076***
(0.025) (0.033) (0.026) (0.025)
Pre-migration job training -0.044 -0.247* -0.043 -0.044
(0.105) (0.141) (0.106) (0.105)
Female 0.224** 0.310** 0.07 0.181
(0.101) (0.127) (0.229) (0.115)
Ethnic German 0.384*** 0.384** 0.439*** 0.400***
(0.148) (0.186) (0.160) (0.150)
Age group
26-35 1.641*** 1.932*** 1.758*** 1.674***
(0.391) (0.440) (0.427) (0.393)
36-45 1.359*** 1.628*** 1.505*** 1.400***
(0.387) (0.432) (0.439) (0.391)
46-55 1.378*** 1.699*** 1.497*** 1.411***
(0.393) (0.438) (0.430) (0.396)
55-65 2.554*** 2.812*** 2.316*** 2.488***
(0.437) (0.489) (0.556) (0.445)
Parents education
General sec and upper vocational -0.097 0.503** -0.133 -0.107
(0.160) (0.213) (0.165) (0.160)
Higher education 0.834*** 1.207*** 0.801*** 0.825***
(0.279) (0.423) (0.280) (0.279)
Urban residence -0.400*** -0.680*** -0.388*** -0.397***
(0.141) (0.188) (0.134) (0.141)
West Germany 0.863 0.991* 0.993* 0.899
(0.550) (0.528) (0.602) (0.553)
Log of GDP per capita in 0.315** 0.342* 0.319** 0.316**
home country at arrival (0.150) (0.199) (0.151) (0.149)
Instability in home country at arrival
Limited political violence -0.302* 0.028 -0.331* -0.310*
(0.172) (0.249) (0.179) (0.173)
Serious political violence 0.337 -0.083 0.211 0.302
(0.350) (0.424) (0.394) (0.355)
Warfare 0.415* 0.416* 0.361 0.400*
(0.221) (0.246) (0.230) (0.221)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 2.4 continued:
OLS IPW IMR MLE
Ethnic networks 0.165** 0.209** 0.169** 0.166**
(0.074) (0.104) (0.073) (0.074)
Linguistic proximity -1.276*** -1.004* -1.042** -1.211***
(0.401) (0.535) (0.524) (0.408)
Intercept -5.889*** -6.289*** -6.674*** -6.107***
(1.616) (2.043) (2.003) (1.652)
Selection term 0.518 0.026
(0.708) (0.036)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald 306.03*** 247.68***
Notes: N=13,521. Table presents estimates of the reduced-form wage convergence model using differ-
ent treatments of selectivity bias: inverse propensity weighting (IPW), the Heckman 2-step procedure with
the inverse Mills ratio (IMR), and the full maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Standard errors are in
parentheses; robust for OLS, IPW, and MLE; bootstrapped with 1000 iterations for IMR; *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Base/omitted categories are shown in notes to Table 3. Unknown parents education is
also included in the estimates but not shown here. The dependent variable is the annual change in condi-
tional relative wage averaged over the 5-year period.
Table 2.5: Selection Probit Equation, Marginal Effects
Variables ME Variables ME
Pre-migration years of schooling 0.005*** Instability in home country at ar-
rival
(0.001) Limited political violence -0.030***
Pre-migration job training 0.002 (0.008)
(0.005) Serious political violence -0.114***
Female -0.148*** (0.012)
(0.005) Warfare -0.055***
Ethnic German 0.065*** (0.009)
(0.007) Ethnic networks -0.003
Age group (0.003)
26-35 0.095*** Linguistic proximity 0.198***
(0.012) (0.019)
36-45 0.120*** Average commuting distance -0.008***
(0.012) (0.002)
46-55 0.093*** GDP per capita growth in home -0.005***
(0.012) country, 5-year MA [t+1, t+5] (0.001)
55-65 -0.221*** Mode of interview
(0.013) Self-written and mailed -0.103***
Parents education (0.010)
General sec and upper vocational -0.024*** Computer assisted -0.004
(0.008) (0.009)
Higher education -0.027** Interviewer
(0.012) First interview -0.085***
Urban residence 0.013* (0.011)
(0.007) Different interviewer -0.021***
West Germany 0.115*** (0.008)
(0.026) Intercept Yes
Log of GDP per capita in 0.004
home country at arrival (0.006) Year FE Yes
Notes: N=37,691. Table presents estimates of the selection probit equation described in Section 4.3. Re-
ported are the marginal effects (MEs) evaluated at sample means. The means can be found in column Sample
B of Table 3. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Base/omitted
categories are shown in notes to Table 3. Unknown parents education is also included in the estimates but
not shown here.
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Table 2.6: Alternative Specification I, Reduced Form
Absolute
Wage Growth
Unconditional
Relative
Wage Growth
Conditional
Relative
Wage Growth
Pre-migration years of schooling -0.004 -0.027 0.079***
(0.038) (0.022) (0.025)
Pre-migration job training -0.345** -0.234** -0.032
(0.151) (0.096) (0.106)
Female 0.986*** 1.782*** 0.225
(0.246) (0.160) (0.173)
Ethnic German 0.121 -0.554*** 0.427***
(0.204) (0.118) (0.127)
Age group
26-35 -3.538*** -2.881*** 1.582***
(0.587) (0.339) (0.409)
36-45 -5.271*** -4.099*** 1.281***
(0.587) (0.341) (0.410)
46-55 -5.056*** -3.846*** 1.308***
(0.580) (0.338) (0.406)
55-65 -4.037*** -0.458 2.520***
(0.709) (0.429) (0.501)
Parents’ education
General sec and upper vocational 0.141 0.355** -0.111
(0.253) (0.147) (0.163)
Higher education 1.440*** 1.072*** 0.840***
(0.445) (0.240) (0.278)
Urban residence -0.825*** -0.667*** -0.396***
(0.190) (0.118) (0.134)
West Germany -0.508 -1.267** 0.867
(0.885) (0.497) (0.575)
Log of GDP per capita in home country
at arrival
0.370* 0.084 0.368**
(0.220) (0.131) (0.149)
Instability in home country at arrival
Limited political violence -0.077 0.112 -0.328*
(0.264) (0.161) (0.176)
Serious political violence 0.641 1.379*** 0.251
(0.527) (0.325) (0.382)
Warfare 0.263 0.702*** 0.388*
(0.354) (0.213) (0.228)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 2.6 continued:
Absolute
Wage Growth
Unconditional
Relative
Wage Growth
Conditional
Relative
Wage Growth
Ethnic networks 0.166* -0.017 0.215***
(0.099) (0.063) (0.073)
Linguistic proximity -2.504*** -3.210*** -1.218***
(0.690) (0.397) (0.471)
Selection term -1.756** -5.229*** -0.015
(0.683) (0.436) (0.480)
Intercept 5.374** 10.135*** -6.244***
(2.499) (1.496) (1.723)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes:N=13,521. Table presents estimates of the reduced-form wage convergence model using different de-
pendent variables. Standard errors are in parentheses; bootstrapped with 1000 iterations; *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Base/omitted categories are shown in notes to Table 3. Unknown parents education is
also included in the estimates but not shown here.
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Table 2.7: Post-migration Accumulation of Human Capital
Panel A: First Stage
Formal Schooling Job Training
Supply of training in a, log 0.708*** 0.660***
(0.111) (0.112)
Excess demand for training in next five
years
0.202*** 0.076***
(0.023) (0.020)
Panel B: Final Stage
Conditional Relative Wage Growth
Post-migration formal schooling 2.060*
(1.059)
Post-migration job training 3.352
(2.262)
Pre-migration years of formal schooling 0.012
(0.041)
Pre-migration job training 0.036
(0.134)
Female 0.291
(0.247)
Ethnic German -0.113
(0.367)
Age group
26-35 2.713***
(0.617)
36-45 2.987***
(0.790)
46-55 3.261***
(0.885)
55-65 4.494***
(1.079)
Parents’ education
General sec and upper vocational -0.746**
(0.323)
Higher education 0.401
(0.334)
Urban residence -0.331**
(0.142)
West Germany 2.324**
(1.157)
Continued on next page . . .
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Table 2.7 continued:
Panel B: Final Stage
Conditional Relative Wage Growth
Log of GDP per capita in home country
at arrival
0.502***
(0.167)
Instability in home country at arrival
Limited political violence -0.301*
(0.181)
Serious political violence 0.730*
(0.443)
Warfare 0.187
(0.279)
Ethnic networks 0.226***
(0.086)
Linguistic proximity -1.296**
(0.544)
Selection term 0.236
(0.719)
Intercept -10.641***
(2.867)
Year FE Yes
Notes: N=13,521. Table presents estimates of the instrumental variable method. Standard errors are in
parentheses; bootstrapped with 1000 iterations;*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Base/omitted cate-
gories are shown in notes to Table 3. Unknown parents education is also included in the estimates but not
shown here.
105
2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Individual Returns to Years Since Migration
Notes: The left panel shows the distribution of returns to years since migration. The returns
are obtained from the linear mixed model with correlated random intercepts and slopes, as
shown in Equation (1). The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. The plotted returns
are the best linear unbiased predictors (BLUPs) of the random slope of the number of years
since migration plus the mean return. When multiplied by 100, they show the percent wage
increase for each additional year spent in the host country. The panel on the right shows the
scatterplot of the BLUPs of random slope and random intercept estimated from the same
linear mixed model.
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Figure 2.2: Age-Wage Profiles
Notes: Figure 2A plots the life-cycle profile of the log of hourly wage for natives and
immigrants. Figures 2B-2D show the relative wage, which is defined as the placement of
immigrants in the native wage distribution. Definitions of relative wage are discussed in
Section 2. The 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimate is also shown.
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Figure 2.3: Employment Outcomes and Survey Participation over Life Cycle
Notes: The trajectories are predicted marginal effects from the probit regression of the
corresponding outcome on the full two-way interaction between the migration status and a
quadratic polynomial in age with robust standard errors. The probability of unemployment
is conditional on being in the labor force. The probability of exiting employment in t+1 is
conditional in being employed in t. The migration status is a binary variable that takes the
value of 0 for natives and 1 for immigrants. The 95 percent confidence interval for the point
estimate is also shown.
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Figure 2.4: Demand and Supply of Training Programs
Notes: This figure plots the time-series for the demand and supply of government-sponsored
training programs. Only West Germany is shown for the consistency of time-series. The ex-
cess demand is calculated as the difference between the log of unplaced training applicants
and the log of unfilled training places still registered with employment offices. Other indica-
tors are in thousands of people/vacancies per year. The data source is the German Federal
Ministry of Education and Research.
Figure 2.5: Year Effects and Secular Trend in Wage Convergence
Notes: This figure plots the year effects from the estimated model of wage convergence pre-
sented in Table 4, Column 4 (MLE). The red line shows a secular trend in wage convergence.
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Figure 2.6: Perceived level of Discrimination
Notes: The trajectories are predicted marginal effects from the probit regression of the
corresponding outcome on the full two-way interaction between the migration status and a
quadratic polynomial in age with robust standard errors. The migration status is a binary
variable that takes the value of 0 for individuals born in Germany without German citizenship
and 1 for immigrants. The 95 percent confidence interval for the point estimate is also shown.
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Appendix A: Appendices for Chapter 1
A.1 Data Appendix
A.1.1 Construction of Linguistic Distance
I construct the Lavenshtein linguistic distance using the Automated Similarity Judgement
Program (ASJP) provided by German Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology1.
The ASJP program uses a list of 40 words (similar to Swadesh (1955) list) for all languages
to calculate the distance matrix. The words selected in the list have no cultural context
and are present in all languages. These words are first transcribed into a standardized
orthography, the ASJPcode and then the normalized divided Lavenshtein distance (LDND)2
between each word pair of the two languages is calculated. ASJPcode uses only the symbols
from QWERTY keyboard and has 7 vowel symbols and 34 consonant symbols.
Levenshtein distance (LD) is the number of consecutive additions, deletions or substitu-
tions required to change one word into the other. Further, dividing each LD by its theoretical
maximum yields the normalized LD (LDN). To correct for chance resemblances due to over-
lap in phoneme inventories or shared phonotactic preferences in the two languages, LDN
is then divided by the average LDN of N(N-1)/2 pairings of words with different meanings
to produce the final linguistic distance measure of normalized divided Levenshtein distance
(LDND). The benefits of this measure is that it can be calculated between any pair of lan-
guages, is continuous and provides variation between languages even if they belong to same
language families. For comparison, I present both ASJP linguistic distance and the linguistic
proximity measure based on language family (LP(Tree)) in Table A.1 . Linguistic proximity
can only take 4 values: 0, 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75.
1Refer http://asjp.clld.org/ for more information
2For a detailed description of the LDND measure, refer Bakker et al. (2009)
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Table A.1: Languages with Highest and Lowest Linguistic Distance from Standard German
in SOEP
Highest Lowest
Language LP (Tree) LD (ASJP) Language LD (Tree) LD (ASJP)
Korean 0 1.0468 Luxembourgish 0.75 0.4083
Palestinian Arabic 0 1.0332 Dutch 0.75 0.4883
Malay 0 1.03 Afrikaans 0.75 0.595
Arabic Gulf Spoken 0 1.024 Norwegian Bokmaal 0.5 0.6438
Maltese 0 1.0227 Swedish 0.5 0.6979
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A.1.2 Description of Variables
The description of the common variables is obtained from the second chapter.
Variable Description
Log of hourly wage This variable is based on the net income earned from employment
last month in constant 2010 prices (in Euro). Net income means
the amount after deduction of taxes, social security, and unem-
ployment and health insurance. The amount excludes vacation
pay or back pay. Net labor earnings last month in current prices
are part of the dataset of generated variables SOEP (2014a). The
calculation of the log of hourly wage involves the following steps:
• Exclude imputed values of net labor earnings due to poten-
tial match bias from earnings imputation (Bollinger and
Hirsch, 2006). Instead, we use the selection-correction
methods to account for missing values in earnings.
• Deflate labor earnings to 2010 Euros by using annual CPI
for Germany (West Germany until 1990) OECD (2016b).
• Divide real labor earnings by the product of actual working
hours per week and (30/7) number of weeks in a month.
Contractual hours are not used because they are not avail-
able for the self-employed and exclude over-time work.
• Take the log of the calculated hourly wage and denote it
as wit.
Years since migration Number of years since immigration, or years since migration in
the host country, is calculated as year of survey minus year of
immigration.
Work experience Total length of full-time employment, in years and months. This
variable is part of the generated variables for public use; see
documentation of generated variables in SOEP (2014a).
Years of schooling Number of years of education or training. This variable is part
of the generated variables for public use; see documentation of
generated variables in SOEP (2014b).
Place of upbringing in
childhood
Four categories are created to characterize the place of upbring-
ing in childhood: [1] Medium or large city, [2] Small city, [3] Rural
area, and [4] Unknown. The first category is chosen as a base
category. The share of respondents in the unknown category is
about 6 percent.
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Variable Description
Parents’ education The variable represents the highest level of schooling completed
by a parent: [1] Level I Basic secondary, lower vocational or less,
[2] Level II General secondary or upper vocational, [3] Level
III Higher education or more, and [4] Unknown level of parents
education. The first category is chosen as a base category.
This variable is constructed based the level of general schooling
and the level of professional education provided for each par-
ent in the biography dataset BIOPAREN (SOEP, 2014b). First,
we aggregate all levels of schooling into three categories. Level
III includes degrees from technical engineering school, college,
university, and foreign college. Level II includes degrees from
intermediate school, technical school, upper secondary school,
vocational school, foreign vocational school, health care school,
and special technical school. Level I consists of other types of
schooling, which are not in Level II or III and include basic sec-
ondary school degree, incomplete secondary school, no schooling,
apprenticeship, and on-the-job training. Then, we choose the
highest level completed among parents. If information is only
available for one parent, only that parents data is used. If the
level of schooling is missing for both parents, then these respon-
dents are combined into the fourth category Unknown level of
parents education. The share of respondents in the unknown
category is about 5 percent.
Linguistic distance The ASJP lingusitic distance is classified into 4 categories (LD1 -
LD4): LD1 equals 1 if the linguistic distance is zero; LD2 equals
1 if linguistic distance is between 0.25 and 0.5; LD3 equals 1 if
linguistic distance is between 0.5 and 0.75; and LD4 equals 1 if
linguistic distance is between 0.75 and 1.
Average commuting dis-
tance to work
The average distance (in kilometers) between home and work-
place varies by state and year . The variable is constructed using
individual reports on commuting distance from home to work
available in PL file, which is then averaged at the state-year
level. The distance is top coded at 200 km. The information
is available for selected years and the values for missing years
are taken from the neighboring year: 1984-87 from 1985, 1988-
89 from 1990, 1991-92 from 1993 (and 1990 for East Germany),
1994 and 1996 from 1995, 1997 and 1999 from 1998, and 2000
from 2001. After 2000, the question on commuting distance is
asked every year. Individuals who have workplace and home
in the same building are assigned a zero distance. Individuals
whose location of work varies or answered ‘difficult to say are
assigned a missing value for the distance.
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Variable Description
Urban residence Equals 1 if the induvidual’s residence in an urban region as pro-
vided in HBRUTTO file.
Ethnic German A dummy variable indicating if an immigrant is of German de-
scent from Eastern Europe.
Unified Germany This dummy variable equals 1 if the survey year is higher than
or equal to 1990.
Guest-worker Treaty This is a time varying dummy variable that equals 1 if the coun-
try has or had in past been in a Guest-worker treaty with West
Germany.
Contiguity This dummy variable equals 1 if the country of origin and Ger-
many share a border.
European Union This dummy variable equals 1 if the country of origin is a a
member of the European Union in the survey year.
Country of origin Country of origin is defined as Germany if a person is born in
Germany or immigrated before 1949. Other 130+ countries of
origin are re-coded according to the UN country classification
in order to link individual observations with macro indicators.
Kurdistan is coded as Turkey, Benelux as Netherlands, and the
Free City of Gdansk as Poland. Categories for No nationality,
Africa, Other unspecified foreign country, and Unspecified coun-
try within EU are coded as missing. The category unspecified
Eastern Europe, which mostly includes immigrants from former
German territories of Eastern Europe, is kept separately, but
linked with macro indicators from Poland. Year of immigration
is the calendar year in which the first immigration to territories
of the Federal Republic of Germany occurred. Both of these
variables are provided for public use as part of the biography
and life history data; see documentation of biography variables
in SOEP (2014b).
GDP per capital GDP numbers are taken from multiple sources. To make num-
bers consistent across sources, we first build an annual growth
series for GDP per capita in constant prices. In 98 percent
of our sample, we use the Conference Board Total Economy
Database (TED, 2015), from which we extract the growth rate
of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars
between 1960 and 2014. Missing values are replaced with real
growth rates obtained from the (Maddison-Project, 2013) and
the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2016) . The former
source employs the same definition of GDP per capita as in
(TED, 2015), while the latter source reports PPP-adjusted real
GDP per capita in constant 2011 international dollars.
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Variable Description
For some countries that split apart (e.g., Czechoslovakia, Yu-
goslavia), the Maddison Project publishes the growth series for
country parts before the breakup. However, GDP per capita is not
available in any source for ex-USSR republics before 1980. Since
some immigrants came to Germany from the former Soviet Union
before 1980, we use real wage growth instead of GDP per capita
growth for the Soviet republics between 1960 and 1980. Real wage
growth is obtained from inflation-adjusted monthly wage series re-
ported by the Central Statistical Board of the USSR.
The above four sources provide a complete time series on real
growth of GDP per capita for all countries in GSOEP sample be-
tween 1960 and 2014. By using this growth series and the PPP-
adjusted GDP per capita values in 2011 as a baseline (WDI, 2016),
we construct a time-series of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in con-
stant 2011 international dollars.
GPD per capita
growth in next 5 years
Based on the above mentioned growth series, the variable is calcu-
lated at the average of the growth rate in the next five years.
Political instability We capture political instability in a home country by using the
dataset on Major Episodes of Political Violence (1946-2014) pub-
lished by the for Systemic Peace (2015). This dataset assigns an in-
teger score between 0 and 10 to each major episode of the war for in-
dependence, international violence/warfare, civil violence/warfare,
and ethnic violence/warfare, where 0 indicates no episodes of po-
litical violence, 1 denotes sporadic political violence, and 10 stands
for extermination and annihilation. All these scores are summed
up into a combined index of political violence, which in our sample
varies from 0 (74 percent of all immigrants) to 14 (Iraq in 1986).
The original source does not provide scores for parts of former uni-
fied countries. Since many immigrants came from the former Soviet
Union and ex-Yugoslavia, we use a variety of web sources to create
the index of political violence for each republic before the breakup.
This variable is highly skewed, with only 2 percent of immigrants
coming from countries with the index higher than 4. Instead of
treating it as a continuous variable, we aggregate scores into four
distinct categories (MEPVCAT): 0=no episodes of political vio-
lence, 1 or 2=limited political violence, 3=serious political violence,
4 and above=warfare. In the category of limited political violence,
events are confined to short periods or specific areas; some pop-
ulation dislocation may occur; attributable deaths are up to ten
thousand. Some examples from our sample include Czech Republic
1968, Turkey 1981-1983, Russia 1990, and China 1998.
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Variable Description
In the category of serious political violence, events are longer and
involve a limited use of destruction technologies; population dis-
locations are in the tens of thousands people; attributable deaths
range from ten to fifty thousand. Examples include Syria 1973,
Croatia 1992-1995, Tajikistan 1993-1995, and Kosovo 1996-1999.
In the last category of warfare, events involve a broad use of de-
struction technologies and large dislocations of people; attributable
deaths exceed 50,000 people. Examples include Afghanistan 1978-
2001, Iran-Iraq 1980-1988, Armenia-Azerbaijan 1991-1994, Bosnia
and Herzegovina 1992-1995, and Syria 2011 to present.
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A.2 Technical Appendix
A.2.1 Joint Estimation
The parameter estimates of the joint model (i.e., θabc, θm, θw) are obtained by maxi-
mizing the joint likelihood function given in Equation 1.14. The joint estimation requires
integrating over the three random effects ai, bi and ci, which is computationally intensive.
Thus, a modified joint likelihood is maximized. There are three key steps in calculating
the modified likelihood. First, the multivariate normal distribution of ai, bi and ci is ex-
pressed as the conditional distribution of a and bivariate distribution of bi and ci, i.e.,
f(a,bici; θabc) = f(ai|bi, ci; θa|b,c)f(bi, ci; θbc). Second, only the expressions that depend on
ai (i.e., the probability distribution of wages and the conditional distribution of ai) are kept
inside the integral over ai. Third, with a few mathematical manipulations, the two expres-
sions can be expressed as a normalized Gaussian function whose integral equals 1. Thus, the
integral over ai can be eliminated. The detailed mathematical steps are given in the next
subsection.
The final log likelihood function that is programmed for maximization is given by Equa-
tion A.11. The negative of the log likelihood function is minimized using the nonlinear
multivariate constrained optimization and the interior point algorithm available in Matlab.
To make the computation efficient, the feasible ranges of bi and ci over which the function
is integrated is computed using Singular Value Decomposition. The detailed calculation of
the range (which covers approximately 99.97 percent of the probability mass of b and c) is
given in Section A.2.3.
The standard errors of the parameter estimates are calculated by taking the square root
of the diagonal elements of the inverted Hessian matrix. Although the Hessian matrix can
be calculated within the program, the Hessian such obtained is often inaccurate. Hence,
the Hessian is numerically computed. The parameter estimates (that includes both the
coefficients and the covariance matrix of a, b and c) are then used to get the Best Linear
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Unbiased Predictions (BLUPs) of ai, bi and ci for each individual i. Calculation of BLUPs
requires plugging in the parameter estimates and maximizing the likelihood function at a
per individual basis. The exogenous factors of migration included in Equation 1.12 serve as
exclusion restrictions for identification of parameters.
A.2.2 Modified Joint Likelihood Function
This section explains the detailed mathematical steps taken to reduce the Joint likeli-
hood function’s dependence on ai and to eliminate the integral over ai. Let us express the
joint likelihood given in Equation 1.14 as the following where f(a,bici; θabc) is broken into
f(ai|bi, ci; θa|b,c)f(bi, ci; θbc):
L(θ) =
n∏
i=1
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
∞∫
−∞
{
S∏
s=1
f(Wis|Ti, ai, bi; θw)
}
× f(Ti|ci; θm)f(ai|bi, ci; θa|b,c)f(bi, ci; θbc)daidbidci
(A.1)
In the above equation, only
S∏
s=1
f(Wis|ai, bi; θw) and f(ai|bi, ci; θa|b,c) depend on ai. Let
us focus on these two expressions:
∞∫
−∞
f(Wis|ai, bi; θw)f(ai|bi, ci; θa|b,c)dai
=
∞∫
−∞
{
S∏
s=1
(2piσ2 )
−1/2 exp{−(Wis − β0 − βXXis − (δ + bi)Y SMis − φ(s)− ai)
2
2σ2
}
}
× (2piσa|b,c2)−1/2 exp
−(ai − Σ12Σ−122
bi
ci
)2
2σa|b,c2
dai
(A.2)
Next, let us take the constant terms outside of the integral, express Wis − β0 − βXXis − (δ +
bi)Y SMis−φ(s) as Ds, apply the formula that µa|b,c = Σ12Σ−122
bi
ci
, and bring the product inside
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the exponential function, which converts into a sum.
= ((2piσ2 )
−1/2)S × (2piσa|b,c2)−1/2
∞∫
−∞
exp
−
S∑
s=1
(Ds − ai)2
2σ2
× exp −(ai − µa|b,c)
2
2σa|b,c2
dai
(A.3)
Next, the product of the constants ((2piσ2 )
−1/2)S × (2piσa|b,c2)−1/2 is expressed as C and the
formula (a− b)2 = (a2 − 2ab+ b2) is applied to (Ds − ai)2 and (ai − µa|b,c)2.
= C
∞∫
−∞
exp
(− S∑
s=1
(Ds
2 + ai
2 − 2aiDs)
2σ2
)
× exp
(−(ai2 + µa|b,c2 − 2aiµa|b,c)
2σa|b,c2
)
dai
(A.4)
Next, we can take the other constant terms out of the integral and express their product with C
as C1.
= C × exp{−
S∑
s=1
Ds
2
2σ2
} × exp{− µa|b,c
2
2σa|b,c2
}
∞∫
−∞
exp
(− S∑
s=1
(ai
2 − 2aiDs)
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In the following step, { S
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} is expressed as F and {
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In the next two steps, E
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Now, we can multiply and divide the expression inside the integral by 2pi 1F
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to get the following
expression:
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Note, the integrand is the normalized Gaussian function and hence equals 1.
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Thus, the final modified joint likelihood function is:
L(θ) =
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∞∫
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F
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}
f(bi, ci; θbc)f(Ti|ci; θm)dbidci (A.11)
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A.2.3 Calculating the Range for Numerical Integration
We need to numerically integrate over bi and ci . As b and c are correlated and follow a bivariate
normal f(bi, ci) ∼ N (0,Σbc), their distribution is given by:
f(bi, ci; θbc) =
1
2piσbσc
√
1− ρ2 exp[−
1
2(1− ρ2)
{
b2i
σ2b
− 2ρσbσc
σbσc
+
c2i
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}
] (A.12)
The expression in exponential can be expressed in the matrix form as :
− 1
2(1− ρ2)
[
bi ci
]
A
bi
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 (A.13)
where A is the covariance matrix given by:
 1σ2b − ρσbσc
− ρσbσc 1σ2c
 (A.14)
We can write
bi
ci
 = R
w
z
 (A.15)
which gives
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[
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We use singular value decomposition to decompose A into R (rotation matrix) and S (singular
matrix). This process of basis transformation ensures that w and z have covariance 0.
The obtained S gives σw and σz as
S =
 1σ2w 0
0 1
σ2z
 (A.17)
Finally the range for bi and ci is given by the maximum of b1, b2 and c1, c2 obtained using the
following equation:
|b1|
|c1|
 = k√1− ρ2R
σw
σz
 (A.18)
|b2|
|c2|
 = k√1− ρ2R
 σw
−σz
 (A.19)
k is chosen to be 4 which ensures that 99.97 percent of probability mass of b and c is covered.
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Appendix B: Appendices for Chapter 2
B.1 Data Appendix
The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) is the longest-running panel of private households
and persons in Europe. It is widely used in the migration research, as it is one of a few national
longitudinal surveys with a large representation of immigrants and substantial information on
immigrants. Some examples of the published migration studies based on GSOEP include Bru¨cker
et al. (2014), Constant et al. (2009), Jaeger et al. (2010), Zimmermann (2007), among others.
B.1.1 Samples
GSOEP is collected and distributed by the German Institute for Economic Research, DIW
Berlin. The survey started in 1984 and includes 31 survey waves as of 2014. In 1990, residents of
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) were included in the target population. Later,
several additional samples were drawn to replenish the original sample and to include special sub-
populations such as immigrants and high-income households.
With respect to immigrants, all samples can be divided into two large groups. In the first group
(samples, A, C, E, G, H, J, and K), immigrants are sampled as part of the total population or
subpopulation. In the random samples of total population, the share of immigrants is relatively low:
about 4 percent in the initial sample A and 7 to 12 percent in replenishment samples E, H, J, and K.
Immigrants constitute about 5 percent of high-income earners in sample G and a mere 1.3 percent
of East Germans in sample C. The second group of GSOEP samples includes samples B, D, and M,
which focused specifically on immigrants. Sample B “Foreigners in West Germany” started in 1984
with 1393 households whose head came from one of the five largest guest-worker countries (Turkey,
Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Greece, and Spain). Sample D “Immigrants” started in 1994/95 with
522 households, which consisted primarily of ethnic German immigrants from the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe as well as asylum seekers mainly from the parts of Yugoslavia devastated
by the war. Finally, sample M “Migration” started in 2013 with 2,723 households. It is designed
to account for changes in the composition of migration to Germany since 1995 (Bru¨cker et al.,
2014). All three migration-focused samples have a substantial share of native-born population (27
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percent), since some members of households are born in Germany.
The immigrant status in GSOEP is defined based on the country of birth or in earlier waves
based on the country of residence since 1949. Immigrants in GSOEP come from more than 130
countries. We are using the 95 percent of the original data since researchers outside the European
Union are not allowed to access the entire dataset. We limit the sample of immigrants to those
who were between the ages of 17 and 65 at the time of survey and who arrived to Germany after
1960 at age 14 or older. The sample of natives is constrained by age 17-65. We drop observations
with missing values on migration status, country of origin, the year of migration, work experience,
and the level of schooling. In total, we drop 4.6 percent of observations with missing values in
the constrained sample. Given a very small percent of missing values, we assume that dropped
observations are ignorable or missing completely at random.
B.1.2 Weights
Immigrant-focused GSOEP samples are not a random draw from the German immigrant popu-
lation, and their composition in the GSOEP does not match the national composition of immigrants
by country of origin. Due to sampling design, there is a substantial oversampling of immigrants
from the countries that signed guest-worker agreements and also from Poland and former Soviet
Union. At the same time, immigrants from Asia, Africa, Middle East and other geographic areas are
under-sampled. It is apparent that sample re-weighting is required to match the sample moments
to the population moments. The GSOEP provides researchers with cross-sectional weights *phrf,
which we renamed as CWEIGHT. We employ these weights in calculating national or regional
averages such as moments of national wage distribution or average commuting distance from home
to workplace. However, since many immigrants are sampled outside the main sampling frame,
their cross-sectional weight is often set to zero; for example, more than 40 percent of sample D
“Immigrants” have zero sampling weight.
To keep as many surveyed immigrants as possible in our estimation sample, we develop im-
migrant sampling weights (IWEIGHT) based on the annual share of each home country in total
German population. The OECD International Migration Database (OECD, 2016a) and the Ger-
man Central Register of Foreign Nationals (Auslnderzentralregisters) report the annual composition
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of foreign population by origin, which covers more than 99 percent of foreign population from 1990
to 2015 and 91 to 96 percent from 1984 to 1989. IWEIGHT is obtained as a ratio of the country
share in total German population to the country share in GSOEP sample for each year separately.
The IWEIGHT for German-born respondents is above 1 due to oversampling of the immigrant
population in GSOEP; it ranges between 1.01 and 1.24, with mean=1.08. Most oversampled home
countries with IWEIGHT below 0.3 are countries of the former Soviet Union and Poland, while the
top under-sampled countries with weights above 2 are Israel, Australia, and countries of East Asia
and the Pacific. In addition to using IWEIGHT, we control for standard weighting factors such as
gender, age, and urban area in model estimates.
127
B.2 Description of Variables
B.2.1 Individual-Level Variables
Country of origin and year of immigration
Country of origin is defined as Germany if a person is born in Germany or immigrated before
1949. Other 130+ countries of origin are re-coded according to the UN country classification in
order to link individual observations with macro indicators. Kurdistan is coded as Turkey, Benelux
as Netherlands, and the Free City of Gdansk as Poland. Categories for “No nationality”, “Africa”,
“Other unspecified foreign country”, and “Unspecified country within EU” are coded as missing.
The category unspecified Eastern Europe, which mostly includes immigrants from former German
territories of Eastern Europe, is kept separately, but linked with macro indicators from Poland.
Year of immigration is the calendar year in which the first immigration to territories of the Federal
Republic of Germany occurred. Both of these variables are provided for public use as part of the
biography and life history data; see documentation of biography variables in .
Years since migration (YSM)
Number of years since immigration, or the length of stay in the host country, is calculated as
year of survey minus year of immigration.
Female, age, year of survey
Self-explanatory.
Adjusted years of schooling
Adjusted years of schooling reflect the highest level of schooling achieved rather than the total
number of years attended in school. Adjusted years are created based on the type of completed
secondary school, vocational training, and university education. The following years are assigned
for each completed level of secondary schooling: basic secondary school = 9 years; intermediate
secondary school = 10 years; technical secondary school = 12 years; academic secondary school =
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13 years; other secondary degree = 10 years; dropout = 7 years; currently in secondary school =
7 years. For those who completed university education, the following years are added to 13 years
of academic secondary school: 3 years for technical college, 5 years for university, college abroad,
or engineering institute in East Germany, and 8 years for the master or doctorate degree. Finally,
2 more years are added to years of basic or intermediate secondary schooling if the respondent
completed 2-year vocational or technical school.
Years of formal schooling and job training
These variables are constructed using the spell dataset on activity status between the ages of
15 and 65; see description in SOEP (2014b). We start with six main activities that include formal
schooling, job training, full-time employment, part-time employment, military/civil service, and
unemployment. If more than one activity is reported in a given year, then each activity gets a
corresponding share of one year. We assume continuous schooling from age 7 to age 14 and no job
training before age 15. Then, years of formal schooling and job training at each age are calculated
as a running sum of corresponding spells up to a given age. Based on years of formal schooling and
training at a given age, we construct the following variables:
• Years of formal schooling before migration
• Any job training before migration (binary variable);
• Type of job training before migration; with 4 categories: [0] No training, [1] Short-term
training, less than 2 years, [2] Mid-term training, 2-3.9 years, [3] Long-term training, 4 years
or more.
• Any formal schooling after migration (binary variable);
• Any job training after migration (binary variable);
• Type of job training after migration; with 4 categories: [0] No training, [1] Short-term train-
ing, less than 2 years, [2] Mid-term training, 2-3.9 years, [3] Long-term training, 4 years or
more.
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Ethnic German
A dummy variable indicating if an immigrant is of German descent from Eastern Europe.
Ethnicity is only available for immigrants.
Parents’ education
The variable represents the highest level of schooling completed by a parent: [1] Level I “Basic
secondary, lower vocational or less”, [2] Level II “General secondary or upper vocational”, [3]
Level III “Higher education or more”, and [4] Unknown level of parents education. The first
category is chosen as a base category. This variable is constructed based the level of general
schooling and the level of professional education provided for each parent in the biography dataset
BIOPAREN (SOEP, 2014b). First, we aggregate all levels of schooling into three categories. Level
III includes degrees from technical engineering school, college, university, and foreign college. Level
II includes degrees from intermediate school, technical school, upper secondary school, vocational
school, foreign vocational school, health care school, and special technical school. Level I consists
of other types of schooling, which are not in Level II or III and include basic secondary school
degree, incomplete secondary school, no schooling, apprenticeship, and on-the-job training. Then,
we choose the highest level completed among parents. If information is only available for one
parent, only that parent’s data is used. If the level of schooling is missing for both parents, then
these respondents are combined into the fourth category “Unknown level of parents’ education”.
The share of immigrants in the unknown category is about 10 percent.
Urban area
A dummy variable indicating if the respondent resides in urban area. It is part of the HBRUTTO
data file in GSOEP. The variable is nearly time-constant; only 2 percent of all immigrants move
from urban to rural or back (0.25 percent per annum).
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West Germany
A dummy variable indicating if the respondent resides in West Germany. It is part of the
HBRUTTO data file in GSOEP. The variable is nearly time-constant; less than 1 percent of all
immigrants move between West and East Germany (0.1 percent per annum).
Hourly wage
This variable is based on the net income earned from employment last month in constant 2010
prices (in Euro). Net income means the amount after deduction of taxes, social security, and
unemployment and health insurance. The amount excludes vacation pay or back pay. Net labor
earnings last month in current prices are part of the dataset of generated variables SOEP (2014a).
The calculation of the log of hourly wage involves the following steps:
• Exclude imputed values of net labor earnings due to potential match bias from earnings
imputation (Bollinger and Hirsch, 2006). Instead, we use the selection-correction methods
to account for missing values in earnings.
• Deflate labor earnings to 2010 Euros by using annual CPI for Germany (West Germany until
1990) OECD (2016b).
• Divide real labor earnings by the product of actual working hours per week and (30/7)
number of weeks in a month. Contractual hours are not used because they are not available
for the self-employed and exclude over-time work.
• Take the log of the calculated hourly wage and denote it as wit.
Based on the log of hourly wage, wit, we construct the following variables:
• Wage growth, wit, is the average annual growth over the future 5-year period, wit =
(1/5)
∑t+4
t (wit+1 − wit) . The minimum of three out of five possible growth data points
is used in calculating average annual wage growth over the 5-year period. The average
annual growth is chosen over the 5-year log difference (wt+5−wt) to retain information from
interim years, to mitigate noise in reported income and hours, and to reduce the influence of
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temporary jumps/drops in wage rate. The 5-year interval is chosen because it is not too short
to be overly sensitive to transitory earnings shocks and to the measurement error, but not too
long to lose a significant number of observations due to survey attrition and outmigration.
• Wage growth observed is a binary indicator that takes up the value of one if wage growth
is observed, and the value of zero if otherwise.
• Relative wage (percentile), θit, is the position of the immigrant in the wage distribution
of comparable natives with the same observed characteristics. In constructing relative wage,
we first obtain the percentile values of the residuals from the regression of native wages on the
X vector in year t. Then, we predict residuals for each immigrant and find the corresponding
percentile θit in the residual distribution of natives. Using this method, we obtain three
measures of relative wage depending on specification of the X vector: (i) unconditional if X
includes only the intercept; (ii) age-specific if X also contains a quartic polynomial in age;
and (iii) conditional if X includes the level of schooling, urban residence, and location in West
Germany in addition to the intercept and a quartic polynomial in age.
• Change in relative wage (percentile), θit, is the average annual change in relative wage
over the future 5-year period, θit = (1/5)
∑t+4
t (θit+1 − θit) .
Employment participation
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is working and the value of 0 if
not-working. It is based on the labor force status from the dataset of generated variables (SOEP,
2014a).
Unemployment
A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the respondent is not-working and registered
unemployed and the value of 0 if the respondent is working. It is based on the labor force status from
the dataset of generated variables (SOEP, 2014a). The probability of unemployment is conditional
on being in the labor force.
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Average distance to work by region
We calculate the average distance (in kilometers) between home and workplace by state and
year to proxy for fixed costs associated with work. The variable is constructed using individual
reports on commuting distance from home to work available in PL file, which is then averaged at
the state-year level. The distance is top coded at 200 km. The information is available for selected
years and the values for missing years are taken from the neighboring year: 1984-87 from 1985,
1988-89 from 1990, 1991-92 from 1993 (and 1990 for East Germany), 1994 and 1996 from 1995,
1997 and 1999 from 1998, and 2000 from 2001. After 2000, the question on commuting distance is
asked every year. Individuals who have workplace and home in the same building are assigned a
zero distance. Individuals whose location of work varies or answered ‘difficult to say are assigned
a missing value for the distance.
Experienced disadvantage because of the country of origin
We create eight variables of whether an immigrant faced discrimination. The first variable is
created from the survey question: “how often have you personally felt disadvantaged in Germany
because of your country of origin?” It takes the value of 1 if the answer is “often” or “seldom” and
the value of 0 if the answer is “never”.
The immigrant respondents were asked this question in the 1996-2011 and 2013 surveys. Some
natives who are born in Germany without German citizenship or who received German citizenship
later also answered this question. The other seven variables are created from additional questions
asked in 2013 survey: “How often have you felt disadvantaged in the following areas? (1) in looking
for an apartment, (2) in looking for a job, (3) at government offices/agencies, (4) at the police,
(5) at school, (6) in everyday life, (7) at work”. These variables take the value 1 if the answer is
“often” or “seldom” and the value of 0 if the answer is “never”.
Remains in the panel
A binary indicator that takes up the value of one if a respondent in year t remains in the GSOEP
panel after 5 years, and the value of zero if a respondent exits the survey during the following 5
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years.
Mode of interview
The GSOEP uses several different modes of interviews, which we classify into 3 categories:
[1] face-to-face, [2] self-written and mailed, and [3] computer assisted. Web-based interviews are
combined with computer assisted personal interviews into one category.
Interviewer
All household interviews are classified into three categories: [1] first-time interview, [2] recurring
interview with the same interviewer as in the previous round, and [3] recurring interview with a
different interviewer compared to the previous round.
Supply of training offers and excess demand for training
The German Federal Ministry of Education and Research publishes annual statistics on the
demand and supply of training contracts for the West and East Germany separately. Based on
these statistics, we construct the log of supply of training offers and the excess demand for training.
The excess demand is calculated as the difference between the log of unplaced training applicants
and the log of unfilled training places still registered with employment offices (Federal Ministry of
Education and Research, 2015).
B.2.2 Home Country Characteristics
GDP per capita
GDP numbers are taken from multiple sources. To make numbers consistent across sources,
we first build an annual growth series for GDP per capita in constant prices. In 98 percent of
our sample, we use the Conference Board Total Economy Database (TED, 2015), from which we
extract the growth rate of PPP adjusted GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars between 1960
and 2014. Missing values are replaced with real growth rates obtained from the Maddison-Project
(2013) and the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2016) . The former source employs the same
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definition of GDP per capita as in TED (2015), while the latter source reports PPP adjusted real
GDP per capita in constant 2011 international dollars. 1
For some countries that split apart (e.g., Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia), the Maddison Project
publishes the growth series for country parts before the breakup. However, GDP per capita is
not available in any source for ex-USSR republics before 1980. Since some immigrants came to
Germany from the former Soviet Union before 1980, we use real wage growth instead of GDP per
capita growth for the Soviet republics between 1960 and 1980. Real wage growth is obtained from
inflation-adjusted monthly wage series reported by the Central Statistical Board of the USSR.
The above four sources provide a complete time series on annual real growth of GDP per capita
(y˙c[t−1,t] in country c and year t compared to previous year) for all countries in GSOEP sample
between 1961 and 2015. By using this growth series and the PPP-adjusted GDP per capita values
in 2011 as a baseline (WDI, 2016), we construct a time-series of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in
constant 2011 international dollars, y˙ct.
Using y˙c[t−1,t] and y˙ct, we construct the following variables:
• GDP per capita in home country in the year of arrival, y˙ct=a ;
• Average annual growth of GDP per capita in home country over the next 5-year period,
(1/5)
∑t+4
t y˙c[t,t+1];
• Average annual growth of GDP per capita in Germany over the next 5-year period.
Political instability
We capture political instability in a home country by using the dataset on Major Episodes
of Political Violence (1946-2014) published by the (for Systemic Peace, 2015). This dataset
assigns an integer score between 0 and 10 to each major episode of the war for independence,
1Simple coefficient of correlation between the TED and Maddison series of per capita GDP growth is 0.92
and between the TED and WDI series is 0.91.
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international violence/warfare, civil violence/warfare, and ethnic violence/warfare, where 0
indicates no episodes of political violence, 1 denotes sporadic political violence, and 10 stands
for extermination and annihilation. All these scores are summed up into a combined index
of political violence, which in our sample varies from 0 (74 percent of all immigrants) to 14
(Iraq in 1986). The original source does not provide scores for parts of former unified coun-
tries. Since many immigrants came from the former Soviet Union and ex-Yugoslavia, we use
a variety of web sources to create the index of political violence for each republic before the breakup.
This variable is highly skewed, with only 2 percent of immigrants coming from countries with
the index higher than 4. Instead of treating it as a continuous variable, we aggregate scores into four
distinct categories: 0= “no episodes of political violence”, 1 or 2= “limited political violence”, 3=
“serious political violence”, 4 and above= “warfare”. In the category of limited political violence,
events are confined to short periods or specific areas; some population dislocation may occur;
attributable deaths are up to ten thousand. Some examples from our sample include Czech Republic
1968, Turkey 1981-1983, Russia 1990, and China 1998. In the category of serious political violence,
events are longer and involve a limited use of destruction technologies; population dislocations are
in the tens of thousands of people; attributable deaths range from ten to fifty thousand. Examples
include Syria 1973, Croatia 1992-1995, Tajikistan 1993-1995, and Kosovo 1996-1999. In the last
category of warfare, events involve a broad use of destruction technologies and large dislocations
of people; attributable deaths exceed 50,000 people. Examples include Afghanistan 1978-2001,
Iran-Iraq 1980-1988, Armenia-Azerbaijan 1991-1994, Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995, and Syria
2011 to present.
Linguistic proximity
The linguistic proximity between the primary language(s) of home countries and Standard
German was calculated using the language trees classification provided by Ethnologue (2016). For
the primary language, we chose either official language or the most spoken language in countries
with multiple official languages. For example, we chose Hindi for India even though English is a
second official language. The information on the number of people who speaks each language by
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country is also provided in Ethnologue (2016). If the country does not have a dominant language
(e.g., there are two equally spoken languages), then the linguistic proximity is calculated for each
language separately, and the final score is averaged (some examples include Chad, Cyprus, Kenya,
Switzerland, etc.).
The variable takes five possible values based on the primary languages proximity to German
in the language family tree: 0 for languages belonging to a separate family tree (e.g., Arabic,
Turkish), 0.25 for languages that share the tree with German (e.g., French, Greek, Italian, Polish),
0.5 for languages that share the tree branch with German (e.g., Danish, Norwegian, Swedish), 0.75
that share the sub-branch (Afrikaans, Dutch, English), and 1 for German language. For instance,
immigrants from Austria and Liechtenstein are assigned a linguistic proximity score of 1.
Population share of compatriots
We use the officially reported number of foreign population by country of origin as a percentage
of the total German population. Foreign population consists of people who have the citizenship of
their home country. It excludes naturalized German citizens, whom we consider as immigrants.
Although this measure underestimates the share of foreign-born population, it captures well the
major waves of migration from specific countries.
The home country share of foreign population can be obtained with sensible imputations from
1961 and onwards. The OECD International Migration Database (OECD, 2016a) and the German
Central Register of Foreign Nationals (Auslnderzentralregisters) report the annual composition of
foreign population by origin, which covers more than 99 percent of foreign population from 1990
and onwards, 91 to 96 percent from 1969 to 1989, 85 to 90 percent in 1967-1968, and 71 percent
in 1961. Missing values for years 1962-1966 and occasional intermittent missing values in other
years are imputed using a simple country-specific linear interpolation. Missing values for the home
country share in population in the 1960s and 1970s are set to zero if the country has not achieved
the 0.05 percent of total population in the 1980s. In the GSOEP estimation sample, 8 percent of
SMIGPOP values are interpolated and 3 percent are set to zero.
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We split our network measure into (i) established networks based on the stock of immigrants
from the same country of origin 5 years prior to the arrival and (ii) recent networks measured as
additional flows of immigrants from the same country of origin during the last 5 years before the
arrival.
Time trend
Year of survey minus 1983.
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B.3 Additional Estimates
Table B.1: Wage Equation with Years Since Migration
OLS OLS Mixed Mixed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years since migration 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female -0.277*** -0.289*** -0.275*** -0.285***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Age 0.251*** 0.236*** 0.330*** 0.322***
(0.071) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065)
Age2 -0.007*** -0.006** -0.010*** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age3X103 0.079* 0.067* 0.121*** 0.115***
(0.042) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Age4X105 -0.031 -0.024 -0.055** -0.052**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Years of schooling 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.034***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Urban location 0.056*** 0.065*** 0.071*** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013)
West Germany 0.282*** 0.241*** 0.279*** 0.252***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Intercept -1.964*** -1.778*** -2.751*** -2.830***
(0.708) (0.675) (0.655) (0.650)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home country FE No Yes No Yes
R2 0.228 0.362
Standard deviation of aˆi, σˆa 0.399 0.382
(0.014) (0.014)
Standard deviation of bˆi, σˆb 0.017 0.017
(0.001) (0.001)
Correlation (aˆi, bˆi), ρˆab -0.755 -0.767
(0.021) (0.021)
Notes: Table presents the estimates of the wage assimilation model with a random intercept ai and a ran-
dom slope bi on years since migration. The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage rate. Estimates
correspond to Equation (1). Estimates are weighted using sampling weights. Column 4 includes 30 year
fixed effects instead of a quadratic polynomial of time trend. N of observations=28,711. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table B.2: Alternative Specification II, Reduced Form
Conditional Relative Wage Growth
2-4 1 2 3
Ethnic networks at arrival 0.215***
(0.073)
Ethnic networks 0.237***
(0.085)
Old ethnic networks 0.182**
(0.076)
New ethnic networks 0.046
(0.210)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: N=13,521. Table presents estimates of the reduced-form wage convergence model using different
definitions of immigrant networks. Standard errors are in parentheses; bootstrapped with 1000 iterations;
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Estimates for other covariates, not shown here, are similar to the
baseline estimates.
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B.4 Comparative Statics
(w˙m − w˙n) ≈([rα(1 + p˙m)]−1 + 1)
 [(rαAm(1 + p˙m)K(α+β−1))]
τ
1
1−α
+ p˙m

−
[
([rα(1 + p˙n)]
−1 + 1)[rαAn(1 + p˙n)Kα+β−1]
1
1−α + p˙n
] (B.1)
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where f = (w˙m − w˙n), ϕm = (1 + p˙m), and ϕn = (1 + p˙n).
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For h = ϕnϕm
∂f
∂ϕn
=
1
ϕm
(B.5)
∂h
∂ϕm
= − ϕn
ϕ2m
(B.6)
Hence, the change in wage divergence with respect to the change in relative growth in skill
prices of natives compared to immigrants is given by:
∆f
∆h
=
∂f
∂ϕm
∆ϕm +
∂f
∂ϕn
∆ϕn
∂h
∂ϕm
∆ϕm +
∂h
∂ϕn
∆ϕn
(B.7)
If we hold ϕm constant (i.e., ∆ϕm = 0), we get:
∆f
∆h
=
∂f
∂ϕn
∂h
∂ϕn
(B.8)
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Similarly, if we hold ϕn constant (i.e., ∆ϕn = 0), we get:
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From equations (B.5) and (B.6), the gradient (direction of steepest ascent) of h is:
(∆ϕm,∆ϕn) =
(
1
ϕm
,− ϕn
ϕ2m
)
(B.12)
Plugging these values into equation (B.7), we can see that f also decreases along the gradient
of h.
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B.5 Web Appendix
Figure B.1: Home Country Characteristics by Year of Migration
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